Exploit Database released whitepaper called Using Google as Malware Spreading Technique. The malware distributors spread the programs by using search engine optimization (SEO) techniques, such as link farming, keyword stuffing, and abusing search algorithms. You can refer to this paper:
http://www.exploit-db.com/download_pdf/18206
Tuesday, December 06, 2011
Hacker attack Google, Gmail, YouTube, Yahoo, Apple, Microsoft, Hotmail
The biggest are down!!! Hacker with nickname AlpHaNiX attack Google, Gmail, Youtube, Yahoo, Apple etc. All websites are hacked on domain .cd wich belongs to Democratic Republic of Congo. Hacker use strategy so-called DNS cache poisoning.
Hacked websites: http://apple.cd/, http://yahoo.cd/, http://gmail.cd/, http://google.cd/, http://youtube.cd/, http://linux.cd/, http://samsung.cd/, http://hotmail.cd/, http://microsoft.cd/
DNS cache poisoning is a security or data integrity compromise in the Domain Name System (DNS). The compromise occurs when data is introduced into a DNS name server's cache database that did not originate from authoritative DNS sources. It may be a deliberate attempt of a maliciously crafted attack on a name server.
For details, please refer here:
Thursday, November 10, 2011
Computerized Prison doors hacked with vulnerabilities used by Stuxnet worm
Security holes in the computer systems of federal prisons in the United States can effectively allow hackers to trigger a jailbreak by remote control. The discovery of the Stuxnet worm has alerted governments around the world about the possibility of industrial control systems being targeted by hackers.
A team of researchers with John Strauchs, Tiffany Rad and Teague Newman presented their findings at a recent security conference. They said the project wasn't really all that difficult -- it just took a little time, some equipment bought online and a basement workspace. The idea for the research came about from work that Strauchs had done previously.
"I designed a maximum security prison security system. That is, I did the engineering quite a few years ago and literally on Christmas Eve, the warden of that prison after it was occupied, called me and told me all the doors had popped open, including on death row, which of course sent chills down my spine. So we fixed that problem very quickly. It was a minor technical thing that had to do with the equipment used, but the gist of it was it made me think if that could be done accidentally, what was the extent of what you could do if you did it deliberately?"
The security systems in most American prisons are run by special computer equipment called industrial control systems, or ICS. They are also used to control power plants, water treatment facilities and other critical national infrastructure. ICS has increasingly been targeted by hackers because an attack on one such system successfully sabotaged Iran’s nuclear program in 2009.A malicious cyber-intruder could “destroy the doors,” by overloading the electrical system that controls them, locking them permanently open, said Mr. Strauchs, now a consultant who has designed security systems for dozens of state and federal prisons.
The U.S. Department of Homeland Security has confirmed the validity of their results and the researchers have already demonstrated the attack to federal and state Bureaus of Prisons and a number of federal agencies.
Source: http://thehackernews.com/2011/11/computerized-prison-doors-hacked-with.html
A team of researchers with John Strauchs, Tiffany Rad and Teague Newman presented their findings at a recent security conference. They said the project wasn't really all that difficult -- it just took a little time, some equipment bought online and a basement workspace. The idea for the research came about from work that Strauchs had done previously.
"I designed a maximum security prison security system. That is, I did the engineering quite a few years ago and literally on Christmas Eve, the warden of that prison after it was occupied, called me and told me all the doors had popped open, including on death row, which of course sent chills down my spine. So we fixed that problem very quickly. It was a minor technical thing that had to do with the equipment used, but the gist of it was it made me think if that could be done accidentally, what was the extent of what you could do if you did it deliberately?"
The security systems in most American prisons are run by special computer equipment called industrial control systems, or ICS. They are also used to control power plants, water treatment facilities and other critical national infrastructure. ICS has increasingly been targeted by hackers because an attack on one such system successfully sabotaged Iran’s nuclear program in 2009.A malicious cyber-intruder could “destroy the doors,” by overloading the electrical system that controls them, locking them permanently open, said Mr. Strauchs, now a consultant who has designed security systems for dozens of state and federal prisons.
The U.S. Department of Homeland Security has confirmed the validity of their results and the researchers have already demonstrated the attack to federal and state Bureaus of Prisons and a number of federal agencies.
Source: http://thehackernews.com/2011/11/computerized-prison-doors-hacked-with.html
Sqlninja 0.2.6
Sqlninja 0.2.6 "bunga bunga edition" is available! I have been extremely lazy in the last few months or so, and the new job is not really helping me in finding time and motivation to work much on this little old pet project of mine. However, the new version is finally ready! It is basically an official release with all the new features that have been in the SVN for a while (most of them for almost 1 year, ouch). More specifically:
ICMP-based shell (thanks Nico!)
CVE-2010-0232 support to escalate the sqlservr.exe process to SYSTEM (greetz Tavis!)
Header-based injection support
Grab it from the Download page and please report any bug you find :)
http://sqlninja.sourceforge.net/download.html
Sqlninja’s goal is to exploit SQL injection vulnerabilities on web applications that use Microsoft SQL Server as back end. It is released under the GPLv3.There are a lot of other SQL injection tools out there but sqlninja, instead of extracting the data, focuses on getting an interactive shell on the remote DB server and using it as a foothold in the target network.
Here’s what it does:
ICMP-based shell (thanks Nico!)
CVE-2010-0232 support to escalate the sqlservr.exe process to SYSTEM (greetz Tavis!)
Header-based injection support
Grab it from the Download page and please report any bug you find :)
http://sqlninja.sourceforge.net/download.html
Sqlninja’s goal is to exploit SQL injection vulnerabilities on web applications that use Microsoft SQL Server as back end. It is released under the GPLv3.There are a lot of other SQL injection tools out there but sqlninja, instead of extracting the data, focuses on getting an interactive shell on the remote DB server and using it as a foothold in the target network.
Here’s what it does:
- Fingerprint of the remote SQL Server (version, user performing the queries, user privileges, xp_cmdshell availability, DB authentication mode)
- Bruteforce of 'sa' password (in 2 flavors: dictionary-based and incremental)
- Privilege escalation to sysadmin group if 'sa' password has been found
- Creation of a custom xp_cmdshell if the original one has been removed
- Upload of netcat (or any other executable) using only normal HTTP requests (no FTP/TFTP needed)
- TCP/UDP portscan from the target SQL Server to the attacking machine, in order to find a port that is allowed by the firewall of the target network and use it for a reverse shell
- Direct and reverse bindshell, both TCP and UDP
- ICMP-tunneled shell, when no TCP/UDP ports are available for a direct/reverse shell but the DB can ping your box
- DNS-tunneled pseudo-shell, when no TCP/UDP ports are available for a direct/reverse shell, but the DB server can resolve external hostnames (check the documentation for details about how this works)
- Evasion techniques to confuse a few IDS/IPS/WAF
- Integration with Metasploit3, to obtain a graphical access to the remote DB server through a VNC server injection
- Integration with churrasco.exe, to escalate privileges to SYSTEM on w2k3 via token kidnapping
- Support for CVE-2010-0232, to escalate the privileges of sqlservr.exe to SYSTEM
Tuesday, November 08, 2011
Let us stop with the buzz on TOR
Hi to all,
Since a few weeks a huge buzz has arised around the TOR security and especially regarding the attack we have designed and experimented. I decided not to react, not to feed the buzz since I do not like it and if controversy may sometimes be constructive, in the present case, things have gone too far: stupid comments on comments from others (on which basis since we have published only a very few things yet?), personal attacks close sometimes to libelling, huge emotions, doubts and fear that may be understood however, collective hysteria...
However, going on sticking away would in some sense backing this buzz. It is time to remind that the only possible goal is to have more security, to determine whether really our attack can put seriously TOR security into question and go ahead to try to find solutions to improve. Security is a too serious thing to be only a playground for buzz. Even if -- especially as a former military cryptanalyst -- I do not fully agree on a few conceptual choices in TOR, there must be no doubt for anyone about our will to contribute to the TOR security and this from the very beginning. We must not forget that a few people who use TOR are putting sometimes their life into danger (political opponents, militaries...) for a more democratic and free society. In this respect, we cannot waste a precious time. Up to me, the issue is very clear: there is absolutely no doubt that we need a solution like TOR even this solution is far from being perfect. But is there such a thing as a perfect solution, especially if you add political and national security issues?
When I decided to work on TOR -- by mid of 2010 -- I was just interested in the crypto part, looking for some application of the concept of dynamic cryptographic trapdoor that I had imagined a few years ago. So far I could test it only in non public yet real networks. Hence it was not possible to publish anything on those results. So at the beginning, I had nothing against TOR and I still don't.
When it was clear that TOR could also succumbed to this concept, I imagined the attack under the present light of media. If I have a rather good knowledge of network technology, it was not sufficient and I needed to have more skilled guys, especially to find ways to force 3-node routes through compromised nodes with a very high probability. Two of my best students of our N&IS Specialised master, Seun from Nigeria and Leonard from Tanzania -- two really excellent students -- have joined the party on April 2011. They have worked very hard, have done an excellent job both at the academic level and at the operational/technical level. I can say that as a tutor, I am really proud of their work. Of course, for anyone who knows how research works, you never totally start from scratch and Seun and Leonard's first tasks were to establish a bibliography on the existing network approaches used by previous researchers: Murdoch, Evans, Danezis, Pappas, Bendiken... who all have been mentioned in the slides. Then they have developped their own tools/approaches to fit my operational intent. Just as it is required in any research work. And other people doing hacking or research are doing the same.
We have just done research, serious, good and operational research up to me. We have tested our attack in conditions close to the reality. People will make their own ideas. I decided at that time not to make buzz, just to present this work in hacking conferences. Unfortunately my employer -- an academic institution -- has required from me to present my attack to French journalists. I have accepted since an employer is always right...or you have to resign. But at the very end, I did not really mind: who cares about news published in French in the world? Then things went wrong and the hype created by others has gone too far. The TOR foundation contacted me in a form that was probably not very fair -- to my perception at last -- and myself I have to make a throrough criticism of myself when facing the resulting buzz. After 22 years in the Army (in the French Marine Corps Infantry), I suppose that I have kept a not very flexible and accomodating mind. Sorry for that. We have decided that it was necessary to restore the contact with the TOR foundation and its president Roger Dingledine to go beyond our differences in opinions, views and interpretations and go ahead towards more security in TOR in a more constructive way. Any other end would have been totally irresponsible from Seun and me.
Our attack works not because the TOR source code has flaws. Once again, it is well-written and in a secure way. It is more related to conceptual issues. We have just analyzed the TOR network at a higher level, by considering it as a critical infrastructure and using a large, multi-level and coordinated attacks. Up to me according to personal information, which are confirmed partly on the TOR website, I am convinced that China (especially in 2009 and late 2010) has already tried similar attacks and has been, at least partly successful. Of course we cannot accept that.
The main problem comes from the fact that
the TOR network relies on volunteers which most of the time do not secure their computers. That is dramatic. Just imagine the security nightmare in a big company where every user would be free to choose the operationg system, the way to configure it... We will not publish all what we have detected. But be sure that we have seen horrible things as far as security is concerned. In this respect, we think that an overall computer security policy should be enforced and any OR not complying with it should be banned from the network.
TCP is a nightmare as well and this is the main issue. I am not a network expert but I have the feeling that it will difficult to built more security at that level. We have managed to return a few of the TOR protections against DDoS against TOR itself when considering local, surgical strikes.
But to be honest, being able to force 3-node circuits can be exploited only if there exists a significant part of ORs that have been compromised. So back to the first point.
Up to me there is some hope and technical improvements should be possible. Among many possible ideas. we propose:
as an emergency measure, to ban weak ORs that are not secure enough. This requires to make fingerprinting and active auditing what we did actually but only partly for legal reasons.
to add steganography techniques in TOR. Remember that using cryptography focuses attention and hence attacks. Why not a steganographic version of TOR?
to limit not so say prevent the installation of dynamic cryptographic backdoors (memory protection by hardware-based virtualization for instance, malicious cryptography techniques to prevent memory tampering, process protection techniques [we have developped a few in our lab]...).
Seun intends to dedicate his PhD thesis to the enhancement of the TOR security with innovative propositions. He is just waiting for a PhD grant. We are ready to contribute and to be involved anyway.
We have sent all source code and slides to the TOR foundation in order to help it to design and release a potentially more secure version of TOR. Recent exchanges with Roger seem to show that somehow our work is considered as significant and was not greatly exaggerated. That is sufficient to us. I let him confirm or not. We will release the source code and data as scheduled on November 10th (right after PacSec 2011) unless the TOR foundation recommends to wait a little bit more. As researchers and hackers we just need our contribution to be recognized. If it has helped finally to take part to the enhancement of overall TOR security, well we will proud of that.
Special thanks to Dragos, Rodrigo and Filipe.
Eric Filiol & Oluwaseun REMI-OMOSOWON
Source: http://cvo-lab.blogspot.com/2011/11/let-us-stop-with-buzz-on-tor.html
Since a few weeks a huge buzz has arised around the TOR security and especially regarding the attack we have designed and experimented. I decided not to react, not to feed the buzz since I do not like it and if controversy may sometimes be constructive, in the present case, things have gone too far: stupid comments on comments from others (on which basis since we have published only a very few things yet?), personal attacks close sometimes to libelling, huge emotions, doubts and fear that may be understood however, collective hysteria...
However, going on sticking away would in some sense backing this buzz. It is time to remind that the only possible goal is to have more security, to determine whether really our attack can put seriously TOR security into question and go ahead to try to find solutions to improve. Security is a too serious thing to be only a playground for buzz. Even if -- especially as a former military cryptanalyst -- I do not fully agree on a few conceptual choices in TOR, there must be no doubt for anyone about our will to contribute to the TOR security and this from the very beginning. We must not forget that a few people who use TOR are putting sometimes their life into danger (political opponents, militaries...) for a more democratic and free society. In this respect, we cannot waste a precious time. Up to me, the issue is very clear: there is absolutely no doubt that we need a solution like TOR even this solution is far from being perfect. But is there such a thing as a perfect solution, especially if you add political and national security issues?
When I decided to work on TOR -- by mid of 2010 -- I was just interested in the crypto part, looking for some application of the concept of dynamic cryptographic trapdoor that I had imagined a few years ago. So far I could test it only in non public yet real networks. Hence it was not possible to publish anything on those results. So at the beginning, I had nothing against TOR and I still don't.
When it was clear that TOR could also succumbed to this concept, I imagined the attack under the present light of media. If I have a rather good knowledge of network technology, it was not sufficient and I needed to have more skilled guys, especially to find ways to force 3-node routes through compromised nodes with a very high probability. Two of my best students of our N&IS Specialised master, Seun from Nigeria and Leonard from Tanzania -- two really excellent students -- have joined the party on April 2011. They have worked very hard, have done an excellent job both at the academic level and at the operational/technical level. I can say that as a tutor, I am really proud of their work. Of course, for anyone who knows how research works, you never totally start from scratch and Seun and Leonard's first tasks were to establish a bibliography on the existing network approaches used by previous researchers: Murdoch, Evans, Danezis, Pappas, Bendiken... who all have been mentioned in the slides. Then they have developped their own tools/approaches to fit my operational intent. Just as it is required in any research work. And other people doing hacking or research are doing the same.
We have just done research, serious, good and operational research up to me. We have tested our attack in conditions close to the reality. People will make their own ideas. I decided at that time not to make buzz, just to present this work in hacking conferences. Unfortunately my employer -- an academic institution -- has required from me to present my attack to French journalists. I have accepted since an employer is always right...or you have to resign. But at the very end, I did not really mind: who cares about news published in French in the world? Then things went wrong and the hype created by others has gone too far. The TOR foundation contacted me in a form that was probably not very fair -- to my perception at last -- and myself I have to make a throrough criticism of myself when facing the resulting buzz. After 22 years in the Army (in the French Marine Corps Infantry), I suppose that I have kept a not very flexible and accomodating mind. Sorry for that. We have decided that it was necessary to restore the contact with the TOR foundation and its president Roger Dingledine to go beyond our differences in opinions, views and interpretations and go ahead towards more security in TOR in a more constructive way. Any other end would have been totally irresponsible from Seun and me.
Our attack works not because the TOR source code has flaws. Once again, it is well-written and in a secure way. It is more related to conceptual issues. We have just analyzed the TOR network at a higher level, by considering it as a critical infrastructure and using a large, multi-level and coordinated attacks. Up to me according to personal information, which are confirmed partly on the TOR website, I am convinced that China (especially in 2009 and late 2010) has already tried similar attacks and has been, at least partly successful. Of course we cannot accept that.
The main problem comes from the fact that
the TOR network relies on volunteers which most of the time do not secure their computers. That is dramatic. Just imagine the security nightmare in a big company where every user would be free to choose the operationg system, the way to configure it... We will not publish all what we have detected. But be sure that we have seen horrible things as far as security is concerned. In this respect, we think that an overall computer security policy should be enforced and any OR not complying with it should be banned from the network.
TCP is a nightmare as well and this is the main issue. I am not a network expert but I have the feeling that it will difficult to built more security at that level. We have managed to return a few of the TOR protections against DDoS against TOR itself when considering local, surgical strikes.
But to be honest, being able to force 3-node circuits can be exploited only if there exists a significant part of ORs that have been compromised. So back to the first point.
Up to me there is some hope and technical improvements should be possible. Among many possible ideas. we propose:
as an emergency measure, to ban weak ORs that are not secure enough. This requires to make fingerprinting and active auditing what we did actually but only partly for legal reasons.
to add steganography techniques in TOR. Remember that using cryptography focuses attention and hence attacks. Why not a steganographic version of TOR?
to limit not so say prevent the installation of dynamic cryptographic backdoors (memory protection by hardware-based virtualization for instance, malicious cryptography techniques to prevent memory tampering, process protection techniques [we have developped a few in our lab]...).
Seun intends to dedicate his PhD thesis to the enhancement of the TOR security with innovative propositions. He is just waiting for a PhD grant. We are ready to contribute and to be involved anyway.
We have sent all source code and slides to the TOR foundation in order to help it to design and release a potentially more secure version of TOR. Recent exchanges with Roger seem to show that somehow our work is considered as significant and was not greatly exaggerated. That is sufficient to us. I let him confirm or not. We will release the source code and data as scheduled on November 10th (right after PacSec 2011) unless the TOR foundation recommends to wait a little bit more. As researchers and hackers we just need our contribution to be recognized. If it has helped finally to take part to the enhancement of overall TOR security, well we will proud of that.
Special thanks to Dragos, Rodrigo and Filipe.
Eric Filiol & Oluwaseun REMI-OMOSOWON
Source: http://cvo-lab.blogspot.com/2011/11/let-us-stop-with-buzz-on-tor.html
Metasploit Sighting: Exploiting iPhone
Many security researchers use the Metaploit Framework for security proof of concepts and demonstrations. The following video shows Charlie Miller, @0xcharlie, using Metasploit's Meterpreter to handle a session from an exploited iPhone. In this video, Charlie navigates the iPhone's file system and downloads files to his local computer. Charlie found a flaw which allowed him to bypass Apple's coding signing requirements, which allowed him to run arbitrary code on the iPhone.
To see the video, please go to this link:
https://community.rapid7.com/community/metasploit/blog/2011/11/08/metasploit-framework-sighting-exploiting-iphone
To see the video, please go to this link:
https://community.rapid7.com/community/metasploit/blog/2011/11/08/metasploit-framework-sighting-exploiting-iphone
Tuesday, November 01, 2011
Toolkit cracks encrypted information on iOS 5 devices
ElcomSoft updated the iOS Forensic Toolkit with iOS 5 support for recovering keychain information in iOS 5 devices.
Providing near-instant forensic access to encrypted information stored in the latest iPhone and iPad devices, iOS Forensic Toolkit enables access to protected file system dumps extracted from supported Apple devices even if the original device passcode is unknown.
By performing a physical acquisition analysis of the device itself, the toolkit offers instant access to all protected information including SMS and email messages, call history, contacts and organizer data, Web browsing history, voicemail and email accounts and settings, stored logins and passwords, geolocation history and the original plain-text user passcode.
The tool can also perform logical acquisition of iOS devices, or provide forensic access to encrypted iOS file system dumps.
The toolkit can acquire a 16-Gb iPhone 4 in about 20 minutes, or a 32-Gb version in 40 minutes.
With the release of iOS 5, Apple made some minor tweaks and some major changes to data encryption. “There was no break-through in the iOS security model”, says Andrey Belenko, ElcomSoft leading developer. “The architectural changes are more of an evolution of the existing model. However, we highly welcome these changes, as they present better security to the end user. In particular, the number of keychain items that can be decrypted without the passkey is now less than it used to be. Device passcode is one of the hallmarks of Apple’s security model, and they are expanding the use of it to cover more data than ever before.”
The Toolkit currently supports the following iOS devices:
https://www.net-security.org/secworld.php?id=11867
Information about toolkit
http://www.elcomsoft.com/eift.html.
Providing near-instant forensic access to encrypted information stored in the latest iPhone and iPad devices, iOS Forensic Toolkit enables access to protected file system dumps extracted from supported Apple devices even if the original device passcode is unknown.
By performing a physical acquisition analysis of the device itself, the toolkit offers instant access to all protected information including SMS and email messages, call history, contacts and organizer data, Web browsing history, voicemail and email accounts and settings, stored logins and passwords, geolocation history and the original plain-text user passcode.
The tool can also perform logical acquisition of iOS devices, or provide forensic access to encrypted iOS file system dumps.
The toolkit can acquire a 16-Gb iPhone 4 in about 20 minutes, or a 32-Gb version in 40 minutes.
With the release of iOS 5, Apple made some minor tweaks and some major changes to data encryption. “There was no break-through in the iOS security model”, says Andrey Belenko, ElcomSoft leading developer. “The architectural changes are more of an evolution of the existing model. However, we highly welcome these changes, as they present better security to the end user. In particular, the number of keychain items that can be decrypted without the passkey is now less than it used to be. Device passcode is one of the hallmarks of Apple’s security model, and they are expanding the use of it to cover more data than ever before.”
The Toolkit currently supports the following iOS devices:
- iPhone 3G
- iPhone 3GS
- iPhone 4 (GSM and CDMA models)
- iPod Touch (3rd and 4th generations)
- iPad (1st generation only).
https://www.net-security.org/secworld.php?id=11867
Information about toolkit
http://www.elcomsoft.com/eift.html.
Honeynet Project: Android Reverse Engineering (A.R.E.) Virtual Machine released
This VirtualBox-ready VM includes the latest Android malware analysis tools as follows:
- Androguard
- Android sdk/ndk
- APKInspector
- Apktool
- Axmlprinter
- Ded
- Dex2jar
- DroidBox
- Jad
- Smali/Baksmali
Monday, October 31, 2011
THC SSL DOS
Today the German hacker group “The Hacker’s Choice” officially released a new DDoS tool. The tool exploits a weakness in SSL to kick a server off the Internet.
Technical details can be found at http://www.thc.org/thc-ssl-dos.
“We decided to make the official release after realizing that this tool leaked to the public a couple of months ago” said a member of THC who wants to remain anonymous.
The tool departs from traditional DDoS tools: It does not require any bandwidth and just a single attack computer (“bot”).
“We are hoping that the fishy security in SSL does not go unnoticed. The industry should step in to fix the problem so that citizens are safe and secure again. SSL is using
an aging method of protecting private data which is complex, unnecessary and not fit for the 21st century.”, Says a THC member, referring to 3 major vulnerabilities disclosed in SSL over the past 3 years.
Read full article:
http://thehackerschoice.wordpress.com/2011/10/24/thc-ssl-dos/
To download:
http://www.thc.org/thc-ssl-dos/
Technical details can be found at http://www.thc.org/thc-ssl-dos.
“We decided to make the official release after realizing that this tool leaked to the public a couple of months ago” said a member of THC who wants to remain anonymous.
The tool departs from traditional DDoS tools: It does not require any bandwidth and just a single attack computer (“bot”).
“We are hoping that the fishy security in SSL does not go unnoticed. The industry should step in to fix the problem so that citizens are safe and secure again. SSL is using
an aging method of protecting private data which is complex, unnecessary and not fit for the 21st century.”, Says a THC member, referring to 3 major vulnerabilities disclosed in SSL over the past 3 years.
Read full article:
http://thehackerschoice.wordpress.com/2011/10/24/thc-ssl-dos/
To download:
http://www.thc.org/thc-ssl-dos/
Wednesday, October 12, 2011
OWASP Mantra Security Toolkit -3rdBeta
Mantra is a dream that came true. It is a collection of free and open source tools integrated into a web browser, which can become handy for students, penetration testers, web application developers, security professionals etc. It is portable, ready-to-run, compact and follows the true spirit of free and open source software. Mantra is a security framework which can be very helpful in performing all the five phases of attacks including reconnaissance, scanning and enumeration, gaining access, escalation of privileges, maintaining access, and covering tracks. Apart from that it also contains a set of tools targeted for web developers and code debuggers which makes it handy for both offensive security and defensive security related tasks.
Mantra is lite, flexible, portable and user friendly with a nice graphical user interface. You can carry it in memory cards, flash drives, CD/DVDs, etc. It can be run natively on Linux, Windows and Mac platforms. It can also be installed on to your system within minutes. Mantra is absolutely free of cost and takes no time for you to set up.
The third beta of OWASP Mantra Security Toolkit has been released. One of the main features of this version is the multi-language support. Mantra now supports Hindi and Spanish, in addition to English. If you can give us a helping hand by translating Mantra into more languages, feel free to contact us and we will look forward to see you in Team Mantra. This version is based on Firefox 7.0.1 and comes with some new extensions which you will definitely find useful. One of the other changes is renaming the "Ayudha" menu back to "Tools". We all are comfortable with "Tools" and we decided to keep it intact.
Download the file:
http://www.getmantra.com/download/index.html
Mantra is lite, flexible, portable and user friendly with a nice graphical user interface. You can carry it in memory cards, flash drives, CD/DVDs, etc. It can be run natively on Linux, Windows and Mac platforms. It can also be installed on to your system within minutes. Mantra is absolutely free of cost and takes no time for you to set up.
The third beta of OWASP Mantra Security Toolkit has been released. One of the main features of this version is the multi-language support. Mantra now supports Hindi and Spanish, in addition to English. If you can give us a helping hand by translating Mantra into more languages, feel free to contact us and we will look forward to see you in Team Mantra. This version is based on Firefox 7.0.1 and comes with some new extensions which you will definitely find useful. One of the other changes is renaming the "Ayudha" menu back to "Tools". We all are comfortable with "Tools" and we decided to keep it intact.
Download the file:
http://www.getmantra.com/download/index.html
Backdoor Trojan alleged to have been created and used by German law enforcement authorities
Under German law, the police are allowed to use spyware to snoop on suspected criminals – but only under strict guidelines. The spyware must not alter any code on the suspect’s computer and safeguards must be put in place to prevent the Trojan being subverted to include additional functionality.
The Chaos Computer Club (CCC) has announced the discovery of a backdoor Trojan horse that is capable of spying on online activity such as recording Skype conversations and monitoring online behaviour. The CCC implies that the malware was created for, and is being used by, German law enforcement authorities such as the BKA and LKA.
Sophos’s analysis of the malware confirms that it has the following functionality:
* The Trojan can eavesdrop on several communication applications - including Skype, MSN Messenger and Yahoo Messenger
* The Trojan can log keystrokes in Firefox, Opera, Internet Explorer and SeaMonkey
* The Trojan can take JPEG screenshots of what appears on users' screens and record Skype audio calls
* The Trojan attempts to communicate with a remote website
“While it’s not possible to *prove* who authored the malware, it’s beginning to look more and more likely that the German authorities were involved,” said Graham Cluley, senior technology consultant at Sophos. “The malware targets Windows computers and to become infected, you typically might receive an email containing an attached file, or a link to the web which would then infect the computer. SophosLabs detects all malware that we know about – regardless of who the author might be. So whether this malware is state-sponsored or not, we’ve added protection against this attack.”
Source: SecurityPark
The Chaos Computer Club (CCC) has announced the discovery of a backdoor Trojan horse that is capable of spying on online activity such as recording Skype conversations and monitoring online behaviour. The CCC implies that the malware was created for, and is being used by, German law enforcement authorities such as the BKA and LKA.
Sophos’s analysis of the malware confirms that it has the following functionality:
* The Trojan can eavesdrop on several communication applications - including Skype, MSN Messenger and Yahoo Messenger
* The Trojan can log keystrokes in Firefox, Opera, Internet Explorer and SeaMonkey
* The Trojan can take JPEG screenshots of what appears on users' screens and record Skype audio calls
* The Trojan attempts to communicate with a remote website
“While it’s not possible to *prove* who authored the malware, it’s beginning to look more and more likely that the German authorities were involved,” said Graham Cluley, senior technology consultant at Sophos. “The malware targets Windows computers and to become infected, you typically might receive an email containing an attached file, or a link to the web which would then infect the computer. SophosLabs detects all malware that we know about – regardless of who the author might be. So whether this malware is state-sponsored or not, we’ve added protection against this attack.”
Source: SecurityPark
Monday, October 10, 2011
Facebook's URL scanner is vulnerable to cloaking attacks
Members of a hacking think-tank called Blackhat Academy claim that Facebook's URL scanning systems can be tricked into thinking malicious pages are clean by using simple content cloaking techniques.
Such attacks involve Web pages filtering out requests that come from specific clients and feeding them content that is different from what is displayed to regular users. Attackers have been using this method to poison search results on Google for years now by serving keyword-filled pages to its indexing robot, but redirecting visitors to malware when they click on the links. However, it turns out that Facebook is also vulnerable to this type of content forging. "Hatter," one of the Blackhat Academy members, provided a live demonstration, which involved posting the URL to a JPEG file on a wall.
Facebook crawled the URL and added a thumbnail image to the wall post, however, clicking on its corresponding link actually redirected users to YouTube. This happened because the destination page was able to identify Facebook's original request and served a JPEG file.
"While most major sites that allow link submission are vulnerable to this method, sites including Websense, Google+ and Facebook make the requests easily identifiable," the Blackhat Academy hackers said.
"These sites send an initial request to the link in order to store a mirror thumbnail of the image, or a snapshot of the website being linked to. In doing so, many use a custom user agent, or have IP addresses that resolve to a consistent domain name," they explained.
Earlier this week, Facebook signed a partnership with Websense to use the security vendor's cloud-based, real-time Web scanner for malicious URL detection. Blackhat Academy has now provided proof-of-concept code, which, according to its advisory, can be used to bypass it.
Websense doesn't believe that to be the case. "This is nothing new. We use numerous methodologies and systems to ensure that our analysis of content (in real time) is not manipulated by malware authors, including using IP addresses not attributable to Websense so that malware authors are unaware that it is Websense analyzing the content," the company said.
"Also, the Websense ThreatSeeker Network is fed via an opt-in feedback loop from tens of thousands of customers distributed globally. These IPs are also not attributable to Websense.com. It is because of technologies like this that Facebook chose Websense to provide protection for their growing user base of more than 750 million users," it added.
That could well be true, but it's worth keeping in mind that Websense primarily sells security solutions to businesses and Facebook is usually blocked on many corporate networks. It would be logical to assume that relying on its customers' appliances to scan URLs on the social networking website might not have an immediate impact.
Hatter says that as a security research outfit Blackhat Academy follows responsible disclosure and notified Facebook of the content cloaking issue at the end of July. Despite this, the method still works.
"We're well aware of the content forgery technique described and have built protections into our systems to account for it," a Facebook spokesman said via email.
"The content returned when we crawl a shared link is only one of many signals we use to combat spam and abuse on Facebook. We know that this content can change between visits, and therefore can't always be trusted, and our systems account for that," he added.
Earlier this year, Facebook signed a partnership with Web of Trust (WOT), an organization that maintains a community-driven spam URL block list. However, it's well-known that blacklisting is not very efficient and there can be a significant window of exposure between the time when a URL starts being spammed and the time when it's flagged by such a system.
At the very least, content cloaking can be a powerful social engineering technique. A link with a .jpg termination accompanied by a thumbnail can look harmless enough to trick a lot of users into clicking on it.
Facebook and Websense are not the only ones with this problem. Google+ and Digg are also vulnerable to cloaking attacks, but other sites such as Twitter have developed strong protections against them.
Source: http://www.networkworld.com/news/2011/100711-facebooks-url-scanner-is-vulnerable-251737.html
Tuesday, October 04, 2011
OWASP Zed Attack Proxy (ZAP) 1.33
The OWASP Zed Attack Proxy (ZAP) is an easy to use integrated penetration testing tool for finding vulnerabilities in web applications.
It is designed to be used by people with a wide range of security experience and as such is ideal for developers and functional testers who are new to penetration testing as well as being a useful addition to an experienced pen testers toolbox.
The current version of ZAP is is 1.3.3
For more information about ZAProxy:
http://code.google.com/p/zaproxy/
It is designed to be used by people with a wide range of security experience and as such is ideal for developers and functional testers who are new to penetration testing as well as being a useful addition to an experienced pen testers toolbox.
The current version of ZAP is is 1.3.3
For more information about ZAProxy:
http://code.google.com/p/zaproxy/
Monday, October 03, 2011
JBoss, JMX Console, misconfigured DeploymentScanner
Exploit Title: JBoss, JMX Console, misconfigured DeploymentScanner
Date: Oct 3 2011
Author: y0ug codsec.com
Version:
Tested on: Linux
CVE : CVE-2010-0738
POC against misconfigured JBoss JMX Console
It use the addUrl method in DeploymentScanner module
More information
http://packetstormsecurity.org/files/download/105479/JBossWhitepaper.pdf
http://poc-hack.blogspot.com/2011/02/how-to-hack-any-version-of-jboss.html
You need to edit
# $url_cmd to match the war payload url
# $url_shell is your reverse shell url
( only if you want to use reverse_shell("ip", "port") )
The JSP shell is not mine is available every where
I add a -b param that build the war contener to do this you need java
Is a fast POC coded this morning for fun so maybe it don't cover all case/version
Usage:
Build the war contener (need java)
# ./jboss -b
Hack
# ./jboss http://www.vuln.com:8080
For more information, please refer to this ExploitDB link:
http://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/17924/
You also can refer to this whitepaper,JBOSS Exploitation:
http://www.exploit-db.com/download_pdf/17915
Date: Oct 3 2011
Author: y0ug codsec.com
Version:
Tested on: Linux
CVE : CVE-2010-0738
POC against misconfigured JBoss JMX Console
It use the addUrl method in DeploymentScanner module
More information
http://packetstormsecurity.org/files/download/105479/JBossWhitepaper.pdf
http://poc-hack.blogspot.com/2011/02/how-to-hack-any-version-of-jboss.html
You need to edit
# $url_cmd to match the war payload url
# $url_shell is your reverse shell url
( only if you want to use reverse_shell("ip", "port") )
The JSP shell is not mine is available every where
I add a -b param that build the war contener to do this you need java
Is a fast POC coded this morning for fun so maybe it don't cover all case/version
Usage:
Build the war contener (need java)
# ./jboss -b
Hack
# ./jboss http://www.vuln.com:8080
For more information, please refer to this ExploitDB link:
http://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/17924/
You also can refer to this whitepaper,JBOSS Exploitation:
http://www.exploit-db.com/download_pdf/17915
WAVSEP - Web Application Vulnerability Scanner Evaluation Project
A vulnerable web application designed to help assessing the features, quality and accuracy of web application vulnerability scanners.
This evaluation platform contains a collection of unique vulnerable web pages that can be used to test the various properties of web application scanners.
Additional information can be found in the developer's blog: http://sectooladdict.blogspot.com/
Project WAVSEP currently includes the following test cases:
Vulnerabilities:
To see more information and download this tool:
http://code.google.com/p/wavsep/downloads/list
This evaluation platform contains a collection of unique vulnerable web pages that can be used to test the various properties of web application scanners.
Additional information can be found in the developer's blog: http://sectooladdict.blogspot.com/
Project WAVSEP currently includes the following test cases:
Vulnerabilities:
- Reflected XSS: 66 test cases, implemented in 64 jsp pages (GET & POST)
- Error Based SQL Injection: 80 test cases, implemented in 76 jsp pages (GET & POST )
- Blind SQL Injection: 46 test cases, implemented in 44 jsp pages (GET & POST )
- Time Based SQL Injection: 10 test cases, implemented in 10 jsp pages (GET & POST )
- 7 different categories of false positive Reflected XSS vulnerabilities (GET & POST )
- 10 different categories of false positive SQL Injection vulnerabilities (GET & POST)
- A simple web interface for accessing the vulnerable pages
- Sample detection & exploitation payloads for each and every test case
- Database connection pool support, ensuring the consistency of scanning results
To see more information and download this tool:
http://code.google.com/p/wavsep/downloads/list
Arachni v0.3 is out!
Arachni - a dramatic improvement in the detection accuracy of Reflected XSS exposures, and a dramatic improvement in the detection accuracy of SQL Injection exposures (verified on mysql).
Arachni uses various techniques to compensate for the widely heterogeneous environment of web applications.
This includes a combination of widely deployed techniques (taint-analysis, fuzzing, differential analysis, timing/delay attacks) along with novel technologies (rDiff analysis, modular meta-analysis) developed specifically for the framework.
This allows the system to make highly informed decisions using a variety of different inputs; a process which diminishes false positives and even uses them to provide human-like insights into the inner workings of web applications.
Version v0.3 has just been released and it includes a lot of goodies including:
http://arachni.segfault.gr/news
To download Arachni:
https://github.com/Zapotek/arachni/downloads
Arachni uses various techniques to compensate for the widely heterogeneous environment of web applications.
This includes a combination of widely deployed techniques (taint-analysis, fuzzing, differential analysis, timing/delay attacks) along with novel technologies (rDiff analysis, modular meta-analysis) developed specifically for the framework.
This allows the system to make highly informed decisions using a variety of different inputs; a process which diminishes false positives and even uses them to provide human-like insights into the inner workings of web applications.
Version v0.3 has just been released and it includes a lot of goodies including:
- A new custom-written, lightweight Spider
- Add-on support for the WebUI
- Scan scheduler
- AutoDeploy -- Convert any SSH enabled Linux box into a Dispatcher
- Improved accuracy of differential analysis audits
- Improved accuracy of timing attack audits
- Highly optimized timing attacks
http://arachni.segfault.gr/news
To download Arachni:
https://github.com/Zapotek/arachni/downloads
HITB SecConf2011 Malaysia (October 10 to 13)
Run as a not for profit, community backed effort, the Hack in The Box Security Conference (HITBSecConf) series has become the ‘must attend’ event in the calendars of security professionals from around the world.
Having started as a small gathering of Malaysian security specialists in 2002, the event has since expanded out of its home base in Kuala Lumpur to Dubai and in 2010, The Netherlands. Our events are put together by a team of dedicated crew and volunteers and through the continued support of our sponsors, HITBSecConf has grown into the largest network security conference in the Asia Pacific and Middle East region!
The main aim of our conferences has always been to enable the dissemination, discussion and sharing of deep knowledge network security information. Our main focus is on new and groundbreaking attack and defense methods that have not been seen or discussed in public before. HITBSecConf events bring together a unique mix of security professionals, researchers, law enforcement and members of the hacker underground under one roof and our flagship event in Malaysia sees over 1000 attendees.
The event runs over a 4 day period with 2 days of intensive hands on training sessions followed by a two-day conference with either three or four concurrent tracks inclusive of a hands on lab session (HITB Labs) and 15 minute lightning talks (HITB SIGINT). The HITB Labs caters for only 50-100 attendees and these sessions are intensive, hands-on presentations that require audience interaction. The HITB SIGINT (Signal Intelligence/Interrupt) sessions on the other hand, are designed to provide a quick 15 minute overview for material and research that's 'up and coming' - stuff that isn't quite ready for the mainstream tracks of the conference but deserve a mention nonetheless.
In addition to the conference tracks, our events are also further enhanced with an open-to-public technology and exhibition area, lock picking villages, hackerspace villages and of course, our ever popular Capture The Flag competition (CTF) !
For more information about agenda and speaker, please see the link below:
http://conference.hitb.org/hitbsecconf2011kul/
Having started as a small gathering of Malaysian security specialists in 2002, the event has since expanded out of its home base in Kuala Lumpur to Dubai and in 2010, The Netherlands. Our events are put together by a team of dedicated crew and volunteers and through the continued support of our sponsors, HITBSecConf has grown into the largest network security conference in the Asia Pacific and Middle East region!
The main aim of our conferences has always been to enable the dissemination, discussion and sharing of deep knowledge network security information. Our main focus is on new and groundbreaking attack and defense methods that have not been seen or discussed in public before. HITBSecConf events bring together a unique mix of security professionals, researchers, law enforcement and members of the hacker underground under one roof and our flagship event in Malaysia sees over 1000 attendees.
The event runs over a 4 day period with 2 days of intensive hands on training sessions followed by a two-day conference with either three or four concurrent tracks inclusive of a hands on lab session (HITB Labs) and 15 minute lightning talks (HITB SIGINT). The HITB Labs caters for only 50-100 attendees and these sessions are intensive, hands-on presentations that require audience interaction. The HITB SIGINT (Signal Intelligence/Interrupt) sessions on the other hand, are designed to provide a quick 15 minute overview for material and research that's 'up and coming' - stuff that isn't quite ready for the mainstream tracks of the conference but deserve a mention nonetheless.
In addition to the conference tracks, our events are also further enhanced with an open-to-public technology and exhibition area, lock picking villages, hackerspace villages and of course, our ever popular Capture The Flag competition (CTF) !
For more information about agenda and speaker, please see the link below:
http://conference.hitb.org/hitbsecconf2011kul/
Twitter’s t.co URL spoofing.
I saw this article from LY_GS Security Weblog. I'm not sure whether this bug still exploitable or not, but I think Twitter's team has fixed this vulnerability. You can refer to these blog for more information:
http://blog.12k.nl/post/10604842941/twitters-t-co-url-spoofing-updated-again
http://ximen.es/?p=534
http://blog.12k.nl/post/10604842941/twitters-t-co-url-spoofing-updated-again
http://ximen.es/?p=534
Armitage - Cyber Attack Management Tool (Metasploit)
Armitage is a graphical cyber attack management tool for Metasploit that visualizes your targets, recommends exploits, and exposes the advanced capabilities of the framework.
Advanced users will find Armitage valuable for managing remote Metasploit instances and collaboration. Armitage's red team collaboration features allow your team to use the same sessions, share data, and communicate through one Metasploit instance.
Armitage makes Metasploit usable for security practitioners who understand hacking but don't use Metasploit every day. If you want to learn Metasploit and grow into the advanced features, Armitage can help you.
Please refer to Armitage manual here:
http://www.fastandeasyhacking.com/manual
Armitage Screencast:
http://www.fastandeasyhacking.com/media
Advanced users will find Armitage valuable for managing remote Metasploit instances and collaboration. Armitage's red team collaboration features allow your team to use the same sessions, share data, and communicate through one Metasploit instance.
Armitage makes Metasploit usable for security practitioners who understand hacking but don't use Metasploit every day. If you want to learn Metasploit and grow into the advanced features, Armitage can help you.
Please refer to Armitage manual here:
http://www.fastandeasyhacking.com/manual
Armitage Screencast:
http://www.fastandeasyhacking.com/media
Sunday, October 02, 2011
JBOSS Exploitation
Whitepaper called JBoss Exploitation. This paper goes into detail on popping a shell on open JMX consoles.
http://www.exploit-db.com/download_pdf/17915
http://www.exploit-db.com/download_pdf/17915
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